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Hellerstein: Criminal Law Decisions

SOTTO VOCE: THE SUPREME COURT'S LOW
KEY BUT NOT INSIGNIFICANT CRIMEINAL
LAW RULINGS DURING THE 1992 TERM
Hon. George C. Pratt:
We now will be discussing Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendment
developments in the Supreme Court last year. For that we have
Professor William Hellerstein of Brooklyn Law School. He was
among those being considered as a possibility for the New York
State Court of Appeals. He is eminently well qualified and a
nationally known expert in the area of constitutional law, and we
look forward to his comments.
Professor William E. Hellerstein:
INTRODUCTION

In my presentation last year, as in prior years, I again matched
the Court's work in the criminal field for the Term with a current
motion picture. Because the most significant aspect of the 1991
Term was the emergence of a possible centrist force consisting of
Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter the film, "Three
Ninjas," seemed a fit comparison. 1 After the 1992 Term, that is
no longer apt. Instead, "Last Action Hero" may bear the closest
resemblance. In a number of key rulings, Justices O'Connor and
Kennedy agreed with the conservative bloc, leaving Justice
Souter to embark on a more singular journey in the opposite
direction. This was especially true in several key criminal cases,
and in true Schwarzeneggerian fashion, Justice Souter flexed
substantial intellectual muscle as he challenged the conservative
heavies in the never ending battle of good against evil.
The 1992 Term may have been understated, but it was not
insignificant. There were no major sea-change criminal rulings
1. See William E. Hellerstein, A Quiet Year: The Supreme Court's
CriminalLaw DecisionsDuring the 1991 Term, 9 Touao L. REv. 305 (1993).
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that redefined Fourth, Fifth or Sixth Amendment rights.
However, the Court did decide several noteworthy Fourth
Amendment cases, confronted civil forfeiture forcefully in
constitutional terms for the first time, overturned an important
double jeopardy ruling of extremely recent vintage and, with one
exception, continued its erosion of federal habeas corpus
availability. The Court also decided several important Federal
Sentencing Guidelines issues and continued to add to the
complexity of capital punishment litigation, a subject beyond this
paper.
I. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
The most talked about Fourth Amendment 2 decision of the
Term was the so-called "plain touch" case, Minnesota v.
Dickerson,3 in which the Court held that when a police officer
conducting a lawful frisk feels an object other than a weapon, the
officer may seize it without a warrant if the officer's sense of
touch makes it immediately apparent that the object is
4
contraband.
Two Minnesota police officers on patrol saw Dickerson leaving
a building which one of the officers considered a "crack house." 5
Dickerson, who had been walking towards the police, spotted
their squad car and abruptly changed his course. 6 The officers
pulled into an alley and ordered Dickerson to stop and submit to
a patdown search. 7 The search revealed no weapons but as one of
the officers patted him down, he felt a small lump in Dickerson's
front pocket, examined it with his fingers and concluded that "'it
felt to be a lump of crack cocaine in cellophane.'"8 The officer
then reached into Dickerson's pocket and retrieved a small plastic

2. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
3. 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993).
4. Id. at 2135-38.

5. Id. at 2133.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
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bag containing one fifth of one gram of crack cocaine. 9 The
Minnesota Supreme Court ruled in favor of suppression, refusing
"to extend the plain view doctrine to the sense of touch," and
stating that "the sense of touch is far more intrusive into the
personal privacy that is at the core of the Fourth Amendment." 10
Justice White, writing for the Court, disagreed. He saw no
reason to differentiate the plain touch from the plain view
exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement: 11
"[u]nder [the plain view doctrine], if the police are lawfully in a
position from which they view an object, [the] incriminating
character [of the object] is immediately apparent, and... the
officers have a lawful right of access to the object, they may
seize it without a warrant." 12 Justice White thought the plain
view doctrine could easily be applied by analogy to a plain touch
situation:
If a police officer lawfully pats down a suspect's outer clothing
and feels an object whose contour or mass makes its identity
immediately apparent, there has been no invasion of the suspect's
privacy beyond that already authorized by the officer's search for
weapons; if the object is contraband, its warrantless seizure
would be justified by the same practical considerations that
inhere in the plain view context. 13
Justice White rejected the argument that touch is more intrusive
than sight. 14 He pointed out that, under Terry v. Ohio, 15 the frisk
itself was already authorized and that the "plain touch" rationale
does not authorize any greater intrusion: "[t]he very premise of
9. Id. at 2133-34.

10. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 481 N.W.2d 840, 845 (Minn. 1992), aff'd on
other grounds, 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993).
11. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at 2137-38.
12. Id. at 2136-37 (citations omitted).
13. Id. at 2137.
14. Id. at 2137-38.
15. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Absent probable cause to arrest, the
appropriateness of the "stop and frisk" by a police officer must be evaluated
on a reasonableness basis. Id. at 33. "Where such a stop is reasonable ....

the

right to frisk must be immediate and automatic if the reason for the stop
is,... an articulable suspicion of a crime of violence." Id.
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Terry, after all, is that officers will be able to detect the presence
of weapons through the sense of touch and Terry upheld precisely
such a seizure .... The seizure of an item whose identity is
16
already known occasions no further invasion of privacy."
Although the Court rejected the Minnesota Supreme Court's
rationale, Dickerson himself still prevailed because the officer's
testimony established that he did not immediately recognize the
lump in Dickerson's pocket as crack cocaine. 17 Therefore, his
continued exploration of Dickerson's pocket, according to Justice
White, "amounted to the sort of evidentiary search that Terry
expressly refused to authorize .... ",18
Dickerson raises two questions: is the Court's rationale
logically sound and how serious an incursion into Fourth
Amendment rights is the "plain touch" doctrine? The Court noted
that "[m]ost state and federal courts have recognized a so-called
'plain feel' or 'plain touch' corollary to the plain-view
doctrine." 19 Moreover, the logic of the concept has a certain
surface appeal; if a police officer can tell immediately from touch
that an object is contraband, arguably little purpose is served by
placing that object out of bounds until the officer obtains a
warrant.
In People v. Diaz,20 the New York Court of Appeals has
provided an answer to these questions. Judge Hancock's opinion
is a solid articulation of the other side of the "plain touch" issue.
As he points out,

16. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct at 2137-38 (citations omitted); see also Terry,
392 U.S. at 22. The Court in Terry discussed the nature and extent of the
fundamental governmental interest of "effective crime prevention and
detection" and stated, "it is this interest which underlies the recognition that a
police officer may in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner
approach a person for purposes of investigating possibly criminal behavior
even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest." Id.
17. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at 2138.
18. Id. at 2139 (citations omitted). Once the officer did not feel a weapon,
he could not further explore for contraband that was not immediately apparent
during the Terry patdown. Id. at 2138-39.
19. Id. at 2133 n.1 (citations omitted).
20. 81 N.Y.2d 106, 612 N.E.2d 298, 595 N.Y.S.2d 940 (1993).
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[t]he fundamental premise of the plain view exception-i.e., that
items in plain view may be seized without an intrusion greater
than that already authorized-is an invalid assumption if the plain
touch exception is applied. For, even if the intrusion inherent in
the initial act of touching is entirely authorized, the discovery
21
and seizure of the items will entail a further intrusion.
Judge Hancock reminds us that the distinction between seizures
and searches is crucial:
the essential conditions which justify an exception to the
requirement of a warrant to seize an object in the plain view of
the police, simply cannot exist to justify an exception to the
warrant requirement for a search for a concealed object which is
not in plain view. Indeed, the very concept of "plain touch" is a
contradiction in terms: the idea of plainness cannot logically be
associated with information concerning a concealed item which is
available only through the sensory perceptions of someone who
22
touches it.

My concern with Dickerson is more pragmatic than doctrinal.
Although Dickerson was able to salvage his favorable
suppression ruling, others may be less fortunate. The existence of
the "plain touch" doctrine and the facts of Dickerson provide a
road map to police for successful warrantless searches in the
street-encounter context. All that an officer need do is testify that
based on his experience, he knew "immediately" when he
touched the object in question, that it was contraband. While such
testimony may be problematic, judges have not been unknown to
defer to police "expertise" or to accept police testimony with
3
equanimity. 2
In Soldal v. Cook County,24 the Court reminded us to read the
text of the Fourth Amendment, 25 an exercise that the Seventh

21. Id. at 111, 612 N.E.2d at 302, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 944.
22. Id. at 111-12, 612 N.E.2d at 302, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 944.
23. See, e.g., People v. Berrios, 28 N.Y.2d 361, 270 N.E.2d 709, 321
N.Y.S.2d 884 (1971) (despite widespread police perjury in "dropsy" cases,
burden remains with defendants to prove inadmissibility).
24. 113 S. Ct. 538 (1992).
25. The Fourth Amendment provides:
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Circuit apparently shelved when it held that the unlawful towing
away of the Soldals' trailer home to effect an eviction did not
implicate their Fourth Amendment rights, because there was no
26
entry into their home and thus no invasion of their privacy.
One possible explanation for the Seventh Circuit's oversight is
that ever since the Court held in Katz v. United States, 27 that
''
"the Fourth Amendment protects [privacy], not [property], 28 it
has become fashionable to discuss Fourth Amendment issues
solely in terms of privacy interests. Those who do so, however,
forget that although Katz signaled a departure from the property
model previously used by the Court, the Court's focus on privacy
interests was supplemental, not substitutional, to traditional
29
property rights long protected by the Fourth Amendment.
In Soldal, the facts were these: while eviction proceedings were
pending, the manager of a trailer park decided that he would take
things into his own hands and forcibly evict the Soldals by having
their mobile home towed. 30 At the manager's request, the Cook
County Sheriffs department dispatched several deputies to ensure
against any resistance by the Soldals. 31 The employees of the
trailer park wrenched the water and sewer connections from the
trailer, tore off the trailer's canopy and skirting and disconnected
the phone; the employees then hooked the trailer home to a
tractor. 32 Although the deputies knew that there was no eviction
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be

violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
IV.
26. Soldal, 113 S.Ct. at 542.
27. 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (holding that the government violates privacy
interests protected under the Fourth Amendment when it monitors
electronically a public phone booth conversation, even absent any physical
intrusion into the phone booth).
28. Id. at 351.
29. Id. at 353.
30. Soldal, 113 S. Ct. at 541.
31. Id.
32. Id.
U.S. CONST. amend.
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order, and that the actions of the trailer park were illegal, the
deputies refused to accept Mr. Soldal's complaint for criminal
trespass or otherwise interfere with the eviction. 33 Subsequently,
the state court judge presiding over the eviction ruled that the
eviction had been unauthorized, and ordered the now badly
34
damaged trailer returned to the lot.
The Soldals sued in federal district court, under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, alleging that the trailer park company and its manager
had conspired with the "deputy sheriffs to unreasonably seize and
remove" their home in violation of their Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights. 35 The court granted the defendant's motion
36
for summary judgment, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed,
holding that although a "seizure" in the literal sense had
occurred, it was not a seizure within the Fourth Amendment
because there had been no invasion of the Soldals' privacy. 37 The
court also expressed concern that to apply the Fourth Amendment
in pure property cases would burden the federal courts by
38
federalizing areas of law traditionally relegated to the states.
In reversing, Justice White, writing for a unanimous Court,
righted the matter conceptually and minimized the pragmatic
concerns expressed by the Seventh Circuit. 3 9 He pointed out that
the text of the Fourth Amendment "surely cuts against the novel
holding below," 40 and noted that prior cases, such as United
States v. Jacobsen41 and United States v. Place,42 "unmistakably
33. Id. at 542.

34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Soldal v. Cook County, 942 F.2d 1073, 1075 (7th Cir. 1991), rev'd,
113 S. Ct. 538 (1992).
37. Id. at 1076.
38. Id. at 1075-76.
39. Sodl, 113 S. Ct. at 541-45.
40. Id. at 544.

41. 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984). The Fourth Amendment "protects two
types of expectations, one involving 'searches,' the other 'seizures.' A 'search'
occurs when an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider
reasonable is infringed .... A 'seizure' of property occurs when there is
some meaningful interference with an individual's possessory interests in that
property." Id. (citations omitted).
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hold that the Amendment protects property as well as privacy. " 43
In both cases, he observed, the Court, after deciding privacy
issues, went on to engage in Fourth Amendment analyses of
invasions into suspects' possessory interests. 44 Justice White also
made clear that while Katz and subsequent cases, such as
Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden, 45 and Cardwell v.

Lewis, 4 6 shifted the emphasis from property to privacy, they had
not "snuffed out the previously recognized protection for

47
property under the Fourth Amendment.Justice White emphasized further that the Court's "plain view"
decisions also made untenable the Seventh Circuit's interpretation
of the Fourth Amendment. 4 8 He pointed out that if the

Amendment's boundaries were defined exclusively by a right of
privacy, "plain view" seizures, rather than being scrupulously
subjected to Fourth Amendment inquiry, would not implicate the
Amendment. 4 9 He explained "[t]hat is because, the absence of a

privacy

interest

notwithstanding,

'a

seizure

of

the

article ... would obviously invade the owner's possessory
interest."' 5 0 "The plain view doctrine 'merely reflects an
42. 462 U.S. 696, 706-07 (1983) (stating that the "Fourth Amendment
'protects people from unreasonable government intrusions into their legitimate
expectations of privacy'" and it protects property and persons from
unreasonable seizures).
43. Soldal, 113 S. Ct. at 544.
44. Id.
45. 387 U.S. 294 (1967). "[T]he principal object of the Fourth
Amendment is the protection of privacy rather than property... [and t]his
shift in emphasis from property to privacy has come about through a subtle
interplay of substantive and procedural reform." Id. at 304 (citations omitted).
46. 417 U.S. 583, 592, 594 (1974) (holding that the warrantless seizure of
respondent's automobile from a public parking garage and the warrantless
search of the automobile's exterior based on probable cause is reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment). In Soldal, the Court reflected on the Cardwell
decision, in which "both the plurality and dissenting Justices considered
defendant's auto deserving of Fourth Amendment protection even though
privacy interests were not at stake." Soldal, 113 S.Ct. at 545.
47. Soldal, 113 S.Ct. at 545.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 546.
50. Id. (quoting Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 134 (1990)).
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application of the Fourth Amendment's central requirement of
51
reasonableness to the law governing seizures of property.'"
Justice White also made clear that the purpose of the seizure,
which the Seventh Circuit deemed significant, "is wholly
irrelevant to the threshold question of whether the Amendment
applies."52
What matters, is the intrusion on the people's security from
governmental interference. Therefore, the right against
unreasonable seizures would be no less transgressed if the
seizure of the house was undertaken to collect evidence, verify
compliance with a housing regulation, effect an eviction by the
53
police, or on a whim, for no reason at all.
Lastly, Justice White thought the Seventh Circuit's fears that
Fourth Amendment cognizance of pure property cases would
burden the federal courts were ill-founded. 54 He pointed out that
activities such as repossessions or attachments, if they involve
entering a home, intruding on individuals' privacy or interfering
with their liberty, "would implicate the Fourth Amendment even
on the [Seventh Circuit's] own terms." 55 Also, numerous
seizures of this type will survive scrutiny on "reasonableness"
grounds. 56 Lastly, it is unlikely that the police will "further an
enterprise knowing that it is contrary to the law, or proceed to
seize property in the absence of objectively reasonable grounds
57
for doing so."
There are no major implications from this decision. I think it
problematical, as has been suggested, that future search-andseizure litigants may be able to successfully assert standing by
claiming a property interest in the goods seized, even if they
58
cannot demonstrate a privacy interest in the area searched.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. (quoting Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 739 (1983)).
Id. at 548.
Id.
Id. at 548-49.
Id. at 548.

56. Id. at 549.

57. Id.
58. See Ira Mickenberg, Crime Docket Was Quiet, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 23,
1993, at S6, S7.
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However, the bulk of search and seizure issues arise in the
context of challenges to searches, for which stringent standing
requirements, as defined in Rakas v. Illinois,5 9 United States v.
Salvucci,60 and Rawlings v. Kentucky, 6 1 turn on privacy
interests. I do not see Soldal undercutting those cases, even
though what is seized may belong to someone without a
cognizable privacy interest at the time of the search.
My hesitancy to see any modification in the Court's standing
doctrine also stems from last Term's ruling in United States v.
Padilla.62 The Court, in a unanimous per curiam decision, made
short shrift of the Ninth Circuit's aberrational co-conspirator
standing doctrine, in which a co-conspirator was deemed to have
a "legitimate expectation of privacy for Fourth Amendment
purposes if he [had] either a supervisory role in the conspiracy or
joint control over the place or property involved in
the ...

seizure."

63

In Padilla, an Arizona police officer stopped a car on
suspicion. 64 Arciniega, the car's sole occupant, gave the officer
an insurance card indicating that Donald Simpson, a United
States Customs Agent, owned the car. 65 A fellow officer who
arrived at the scene believed that Arciniega matched a drug
59. 439 U.S. 128, 133-34 (1978) (rejecting petitioner's "target" theory

which would have allowed a third party to assert a violation of Fourth
Amendment rights; instead the Court reiterated the Alderman holding which

states, "Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which, like some other
constitutional rights, may not be vicariously asserted" (quoting Alderman v.
United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969))).

60. 448 U.S. 83, 85 (1980) (overruling the "automatic standing rule" of
Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960), which held that a defendant had
automatic standing to challenge the legality of the search that produced the
very drugs he was charged with possessing at the time of the search and stated
that "anyone legitimately on the premises where a search occurs" had standing
to challenge its legality).

61. 448 U.S. 98, 104 (1980) (also holding that a person must have had a
legitimate expectation of privacy in the area subjected to the search to be
protected under the Fourth Amendment).
62. 113 S.Ct. 1936 (1993).

63. Id. at 1937, rev'g 960 F.2d 854 (9th Cir. 1992).
64. Id.
65. Id.
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courier profile and the officers asked Arciniega if they could
search the car. 6 6 Arciniega consented and the search uncovered
560 pounds of cocaine in the trunk. 67 Arciniega agreed to make a
controlled delivery of the cocaine which led to the arrest of Jorge
and Maria Padilla, and later to Simpson and his wife. 68
The Padillas and Simpsons were charged with conspiracy to
distribute and possess with intent to distribute cocaine. 69 They
moved to suppress evidence found during the police investigation
contending that such evidence was the fruit of an illegal stop of
Arciniega's car. 70 The district court granted suppression holding
that, as owners, the "Simpsons retained a reasonable expectation
of privacy in their car, but that the Padillas could contest the stop
solely because of their supervisory roles and their joint control
over the ... operation." 7 1 The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding
that "a coconspirator's [sic] participation in an operation or
arrangement that indicates joint control and supervision of the
72
place searched establishes standing."
Reversing, the Supreme Court pointed out that no other circuit
court had recognized co-conspirator standing, 73 and that it was
directly at odds with Rakas v. llinois,74 Ravlings v. Kentucky, 75
and especially Alderman v. United States,76 in which the Court
stated expressly that co-conspirators have been accorded no
special standing and were not exempt from the principle that
"suppression of the product of a Fourth Amendment violation can
be successfully urged only by those whose rights were violated
by the search itself, not by those who are aggrieved solely by the

66. Id.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1937-38.
Id. at 1938.
Id.

72. United States v. Padilla, 960 F.2d 854, 859 (9th Cir. 1992), rev'd per
curiam, 113 S.Ct. 1936 (1993) (citations omitted).
73. Padilla, 113 S. Ct. at 1938.
74. 439 U.S. 128 (1978). See supra note 59.
75. 448 U.S. 98 (1980). See supra note 61.
76. 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
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introduction of damaging evidence." 7 7 The Court reiterated that
"[e]xpectations of privacy and property interests govern the
analysis of Fourth Amendment search and seizure claims.
Participants in a criminal conspiracy may have such expectations
or interests, but the conspiracy itself neither adds nor detracts
from them." 78
Given existing precedent, the Ninth Circuit's boldness in
embracing a co-conspirator exception was surprising. The
argument in favor of an automatic standing rule is a thing of the
past. It was founded on the proposition that the best way to
enforce the deterrence rationale of the exclusionary rule is to
reject the fruits of an unlawful search or seizure whenever they
are offered in evidence, and it should not matter that the party
seeking suppression is aggrieved only because he or she is in the
dock. The Ninth Circuit's co-conspirator standing rule appears to
have been driven by a similar, though unstated, rationale. The
Rehnquist Court is not the venue in which such a notion can
expect nourishment.
II. THE FORFEITURE CASES
The Term's most remarkable feature was the Court's
willingness to apply some brakes to the runaway vehicle of civil
forfeiture. In so doing, the Court was obviously responsive to
numerous voices that have been raised against the excesses of the
government's use of it in the war on drugs.
In Austin v. United States,79 the Court, for the first time, held

that an in rem forfeiture 80 is a punishment 81 and, as such, is
77. Padilla, 113 S. Ct. at 1939 (quoting Aldennan, 394 U.S. at 171-72).
78. Id.
79. 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993).

80. The government sought forfeiture under 21 U.S.C. § 881, the main
federal civil forfeiture statute. Paragraphs (a)(4) and (a)(7) of section 881
provide that the following are subject to forfeiture:

(a)(4) All conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles, or vessels, which
are used, or are intended for use, to transport, or in any manner to
facilitate the transportation, sale, receipt, possession or concealment of
property described in paragraph (1) [controlled substances which have
been manufactured, distributed, dispensed, or acquired], (2) [raw
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subject to the restraints of the Excessive Fines Clause of the
Eighth Amendment. 82 Consequently, the issue of proportionality
is now part of civil forfeiture, and courts must assess the
relationship between the gravity of an offense and the property
that is seized.
Austin, the proprietor of a South Dakota auto body shop, made
the mistake of agreeing to sell two grams of cocaine to an
undercover agent in his shop. 83 He then went to his mobile home
to retrieve the cocaine and consummated the sale on his return to
the shop. 84 State police officers executed a search warrant on the
body shop and mobile home the next day and discovered small
quantities of marijuana and cocaine, drug paraphernalia, a .22
85
caliber revolver, and $4700 in cash.
After Austin pled guilty in state court to one count of
possessing cocaine with intent to distribute and was sentenced,

the federal government filed a forfeiture action against his mobile
home and body shop, which were valued in excess of $38,000.86
Austin challenged the forfeiture on the ground that, given the
relatively minor nature of his offense, it constituted a violation of

materials, products, and equipment of any kind which are used, or
intended for use, in manufacturing, compounding, processing,
delivering, importing, or exporting any controlled substance], or (9)
[listed chemicals, all drug manufacturing equipment, all tableting
machines, all encapsulating machines, and all gelatin capsules, which
have been imported, exported, manufactured, possessed, distributed, or
intended to be distributed, imported, or exported] ....

(a)(7) All real property, including any right, title, and interest (including
any leasehold interest) in the whole of any lot or tract of land and any
appurtenances or improvements, which is used, or intended to be used,
in any manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate the commission of, a
violation of this subchapter punishable by more than one year's
imprisonment ....
21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(1), (2), (4), (7) (1988).
81. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2810-12.
82. Id. at 2803; U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
83. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2803.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
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the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause. 87 The Eighth
Circuit upheld the forfeiture reluctantly, stating that it was
"troubled by the government's view that any property, whether it
be a hobo's hovel or the Empire State Building, can be seized by
the government because the owner, regardless of his or her past
criminal record, engages in a single drg transaction." 88
Nonetheless, the court was constrained by its understanding that
when the government is proceeding in rem, the owner's guilt or
innocence is "constitutionally irrelevant" and thus, a forfeiture
could not be considered excessive in relationship to any
offense. 89

Writing for the Court, Justice Blackmun pointed out that the
text of the Eighth Amendment, unlike the Sixth Amendment for
example, contained no specific limitation to criminal cases. 90
Thus, he stated that the critical question is not whether forfeiture
is civil or criminal, but whether it is monetary punishment, with
which the Excessive Fines Clause is particularly concerned. 91 He
determined that it was, finding historical support in English and
American law around the time of the adoption of the Eighth
Amendment. 92
Consequently, while acknowledging that the Court has rejected
owner-innocence as a common-law defense to in rem forfeiture,
Justice Blackmun observed that the Court "consistently has
recognized that forfeiture serves, at least, in part, to punish the

87. United States v. 508 Depot St., 964 F.2d 814, 817 (8th Cir. 1992),
rev'd sub nom. Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993).
88. Id. at 818.
89. Id. at 817.

90. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2804-05; see also U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The
Sixth Amendment provides in part:
[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial ....

to be informed of the nature and cause of

the accusation, to be confronted with the witnesses against him, to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defense.

Id.
91. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2806.
92. Id. at 2806-10.
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owner." 93 Justice Blackmun further emphasized that whatever the
status of in rem forfeiture at common law, the statutory forfeiture
provisions applicable to drug cases provide an "innocent owner"
defense. 94 These exemptions, he reasoned, "serve to focus the
provisions on the culpability of the owner in a way that makes
them look more like punishment, not less." 95 Therefore, "[t]he
inclusion of innocent-owner defenses... reveals.., a...
congressional intent to punish only those involved in drug
trafficking."96
Although the Court made it clear that the Excessive Fines
Clause is implicated in the civil forfeiture context, it opted not to
provide guidance as to how proportionality of an in rem
forfeiture should be determined. 97 Instead, it stated that
"[p]rudence dictates that we allow the lower courts to consider
that question in the first instance," and it remanded the case to
the district court to determine whether the forfeiture of Austin's
home and body shop was excessive. 98
Justice Scalia, concurring in part and in the judgment, 99 was
concerned about the majority's apparent belief that "only actual
culpability of the affected property owner can establish that a
forfeiture provision is punitive." 100 He pointed out that "[i]f the
93. Id. at 2810 (citations omitted).
94. Id.; see also 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4)(c), (a)(7) (1988). Section
881(a)(4)(c) provides that "no conveyance shall be forfeited... to the extent
of an interest of an owner, by reason of any act or omission established by that
owner to have been committed or omitted without the knowledge, consent, or
willful blindness of the owner." 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4)(c) (1988). Section
881(a)(7) provides that "no property shall be forfeited .... to the extent of an
interest of an owner, by reason of any act or omission established by that
owner to have been committed or omitted without the knowledge or consent of
that owner." 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1988).
95. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2810-11.
96. Id. at 2811.
97. Id. at 2812.
98. Id. (citing Yee v. City of Escondido, 112 S. Ct. 1522, 1534 (1992)
(expressing the Court's preference for a flly litigated issue in the lower
courts, so that the Court can have the benefit of developed arguments and a
lower court opinion which addresses the issue)).
99. Id. at 2812-15 (Scalia, J., concurring).
100. Id. at 2814 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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Court is correct that culpability of the owner is essential, then
there is no difference (except perhaps the burden of proof)
between the traditional in rem forfeiture and the traditional in
personam forfeiture." 10 1 He would have postponed that question
because in the instant case, the forfeiture provisions were
directed toward the culpable conduct of the owner of the property
and thus the in rem forfeiture, in fact, was a fine. 102
Justice Scalia did, however, articulate his view as to how the
proportionality of an in rem forfeiture should be assessed:
Unlike monetary fines, statutory in rem forfeitures have
traditionally been fixed, not by determining the appropriate value
of the penalty in relation to the committed offense, but by
determining what property has been 'tainted' by unlawful use, to
which issue the value of the property is irrelevant. Scales used to
measure out unlawful drug sales, for example, are confiscatable
whether made of the purest gold or the basest metal. But an in
rem forfeiture goes beyond the traditional limits that the Eighth
Amendment permits if it applies to property that cannot properly
be regarded as an instrumentality of the offense-the building, for
example, in which an isolated drug sale happens to occur. Such a
confiscation would be an excessive fine. The question is not how
much the confiscated property is worth, but whether the
confiscated property has a close enough relationship to the
10 3
offense.
At least one commentator has pointed out that Justice Scalia's
test, the relationship of the property to the offense, retains
potential for disproportionate forfeitures, and has called for a
104
"hybrid balancing of the value and use of the property."
In Alexander v. United States, 105 the Court considered the
constitutional implications of the forfeiture provisions of the
106
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).
101. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
102. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).

103. Id. at 2815 (Scalia, J., concurring).
104. Steven L. Kessler, Forfeiture And the Eighth Amendment, N.Y. L.J.,
July 26, 1993, at 1.

105. 113 S. Ct. 2766 (1993).
106. 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1988).
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Alexander was convicted of multiple counts of transporting and
107 The
selling obscene material through his chain of adult stores.
jury found copies of four magazines and three videotapes being
sold at Alexander's stores to be obscene.108 These obscenity
offenses furnished the predicates for the RICO violations. 109
Alexander was sentenced to six years inprison and a $100,000
fine. 110 In addition, the government sought and obtained
forfeiture of Alexander's multi-million dollar adult business and
real estate holdings. 111 Under the RICO provisions, the property
was forfeited as interests in a corrupt enterprise, and as property
1 12
that afforded Alexander influence over the enterprise.
1 13
Although the Court rejected Alexander's First Amendment
claim, 114 he fared better with his Eighth Amendment
argument. 115 Echoing its decision in Austin, the Court held that
the forfeiture order, considered separately from Alexander's six
year sentence and $100,000 fine, "is clearly a form of monetary
punishment no different, for Eighth Amendment purposes, from a
traditional 'fine.'" 116 As it did in Austin, the Court expressed its
preference that proportionality be determined by the lower
courts, and it remanded the case. 117 Given the Chief Justice's
observation that Alexander "was convicted of creating and
managing what the District Court described as 'an enormous
racketeering enterprise,'" 118 Alexander's prospects on remand
appear slim.
Of the Court's three forfeiture rulings, United States v. 92
Buena Vista Avenue, 119 may be the most surprising. Although six
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2769.
Id.
Id. at 2769-70.
Id. at 2770.
Id.
Id.

113. U.S. CONST. amend. I.

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2770-75.
Id. at 2775-76.
Id.
Id. at 2776; see also supra note 98 and accompanying text.
Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2776.
113 S. Ct. 1126 (1993).
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members of the majority produced two different opinions, the
case's bottom line is that the "relation back" provision of the
civil in rem drug forfeiture statute, 21 U.S.C. § 881(h), 120 does

not automatically vest ownership of drug proceeds in the
government at the very moment that the criminal act takes place
or at the very moment that the proceeds are used to buy
property.

12 1

The claimant in the case bought a house with $240,000 that her
boyfriend gave her. 122 Several years later, the government
bought a civil forfeiture action against the house and established
probable cause to believe that the money was the proceeds of her
boyfriend's drug trafficking endeavors. 123 The district court held
that the innocent owner defense was available only to a bona fide
purchaser for value and not a mere donee. 124 The court also held
that the innocent owner defense was available only to those
claimants who acquired an interest in the property before the acts
125
giving rise to the forfeiture occurred.
120. Section 881(h) provides: "All right, title, and interest in property
described in subsection (a)... shall vest in the United States upon commission
of the act giving rise to forfeiture under this section." 21 U.S.C. § 881(h)
(1988).
121. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. at 1134-42. Justice Stevens, joined by
Justices Blackmun, O'Connor and Souter, concluded that "neither [§ 881(h)]
nor the [relation-back doctrine] makes the government an owner of property
before forfeiture has been decreed." Id. at 1134. Justice Scalia, joined by
Justice Thomas, concurred in the judgment of the plurality opinion by
concluding:
It is a doctrine of retroactive vesting of tide that operates only upon
entry of the judicial order of forfeiture or condemnation: "[t]he decree
of condemnation when entered relates back to the time of the
commission of the wrongful acts, and takes date from the wrongful acts
and not from the date of the sentence or decree."
Id. at 1138 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Henderson's Distilled Spirits, 81
U.S. (14 Wall.) 44, 56 (1872)).
122. Id. at 1134.
123. Id. at 1127-28.
124. United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 738 F. Supp. 854, 860-61
(D.N.J. 1990), aff'd on other grounds, 937 F.2d 98 (3d Cir. 1991), aff'd, 113
S. Ct. 1126 (1993).
125. Id.
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The Third Circuit reversed, holding that the term "owner"
should be broadly construed and is not limited to bona fide
purchasers for value. 126 As to the relation-back issue, the court
declined to impute to Congress an intent to prevent anyone who
obtained property after an illegal drug transaction from becoming
an "innocent owner."127
Section 881(a)(6) provides for the forfeiture of "all proceeds
traceable to" an illegal drug transaction. 12 8 The innocent owner
provision states: "[n]o property shall be forfeited under this
paragraph, to the extent of the interest of an owner, by reason of
any act or omission established by that owner to have been
committed or omitted without the knowledge or consent of the
owner." 12 9 The relation-back provision, added in 1984, states
that "[a]ll right, title, and interest in property described in
subsection (a)... shall vest in the United States upon
commission of the act giving rise to forfeiture under this
section."

13 0

Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Blackmun, O'Connor, and
Souter, pointed out that the statutory provisions at issue, most of
which were added to the drug laws in 1978, were Congress'
initial attempt to seize and forfeit the "proceeds" of illegal drug
transactions. 13 1 Previously, common law and statutory forfeiture
had been directed only at illegal substances and their means of
126. United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 937 F.2d 98, 102 (3d Cir.

1991), aff'd, 113 S. Ct. 1126 (1993). The court interpreted the term owner to
"'include any person with a recognizable legal or equitable interest in the
property seized.'" Id. (quoting Act of Oct. 15, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-633,
1985 U.S.C.A.N. 9522). This broad interpretation is consistent with the
legislative intent of the statute. See also Act of Oct. 15, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95633, 1985 U.S.C.A.N. at 9522-23.
127. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 937 F.2d at 102-03. The court found that
"property referred to in [§ 881(a)] does not include property that has been
exempted from forfeiture by means of an innocent owner defense." Id. at 102.
128. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) (1988).
129. Id.
130. 21 U.S.C. § 881(h) (1988).
131. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. at 1133; see also The Comprehensive
Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513 84 Stat.
1276 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) (1988)).
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production and distribution. 132 The 1978 amendments also
created the innocent owner defense. 133 Because each of these
provisions went beyond the common law, Justice Stevens argued
that the statutory scheme should be construed "with caution." 134
Because "owner" is thrice used unqualifiedly in the forfeiture
scheme, Justice Stevens concluded that Congress did not intend
to limit the innocent owner defense to bona fide purchasers. 135
Therefore, he concluded, a donee who acquired the funds with
which the house was purchased is not disqualified "from claiming
that she is an owner who had no knowledge of the alleged fact
that those funds were 'proceeds traceable' to illegal sales of
controlled substances." 13 6
The government's relation-back argument, if accepted, would
mean that the claimant was never an owner of the property. 137
Justice Stevens found such argument unsupported by either
common law or a fair reading of the forfeiture statute. 138 Vesting
the government with ownership at the moment unlawful proceeds
are used to purchase property, he pointed out, would "effectively
eliminate the innocent owner defense in almost every imaginable
case in which proceeds could be forfeited." 1 3 9 Justice Stevens did
not believe that Congress intended that result when it amended
the statute in 1978 to include "proceeds" and "innocent owner"
provisions. 140
Justice Stevens further observed that although at common law
the relation-back doctrine vested title of the offending res in the
government as of the date of the offending conduct, the same was

132. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. at 1133-34.

133. Id. at 1134; see also 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6), (7) (1988).
134. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. at 1134.
135. Id.
136. Id.

137. Id. The government argued that ownership of the property vested in
the United States at the time the respondent used proceeds of an illegal drug

transaction to pay for the property. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1135.

140. Id.
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not true as to proceeds. 14 1 Even if the common law rule was

extended to proceeds, Justice Stevens pointed out that the
government's title to the proceeds is not "self-executing;" 142 title
still would not have vested until a judicial determination of
forfeiture had been made. 143
Statutorily, the result is no different,

concluded. 144

Justice

Stevens

881(h) 14 5

He argued that section
"merely codified
146
the common-law rule."
When Congress enacted the relationback rule, it could have changed it, but it did not. 147 Justice
Stevens arrived at this conclusion by construing section 881(h)'s
phrase "property described in subsection (a)" to exclude proceeds
148
owned by an individual who is unaware of their illegal source,

which under section 881(a)(6) is "not subject to forfeiture."149
141. Id. The Court stated that it did not know of "any common-law
precedent for treating proceeds traceable to an unlawful exchange as a fictional
wrongdoer subject to forfeiture," therefore the relation back doctrine is not
applicable. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1135-36. Justice Stevens quotes Chief Justice Marshall to explain
"'li]t has been proved, that in all forfeitures accruing at common law, nothing
vests in the government until some legal step shall be taken for the assertion of
its right, after which, for many purposes, the doctrine of relation carries back
the title to the commission of the offense.'" Id. at 1135 (quoting United States
v. Grundy, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 337, 350-51 (1806)).
144. Id. at 1136.
"By the settled doctrine of this court, whenever a statute enacts that
upon the commission of a certain act specific property used in or
connected with that act shall be forfeited, the forfeiture takes effect
immediately upon the commission of the act; the right to the property
then vests in the United States, although their title is not perfected until
judicial condemnation; the forfeiture constitutes a statutory transfer of
the right to the United States at the time the offense is committed; and
the condemnation, when obtained, relates back to that time, and avoids
all intermediate sales and alienations, even to purchasers in good faith."
Id. (quoting United States v. Stowell, 133 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1890) (emphasis
added)).
145. 21 U.S.C. § 881(h) (1988); see also supra note 120.
146. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. at 1136.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1136-37.
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Therefore, Justice Stevens reasoned, the statute must allow the
assertion of an innocent-owner defense before section 881(h)'s
relation-back rule applies. 150
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, concurred in the
judgment, but took issue with Justice Stevens' reading of the
statute. 15 1 He maintained that the mere fact that the application of
the innocent owner provision in section 881(a)(6) must be
determined before the relation-back provision can be fully applied
"does not establish that the word 'owner' in (a)(6) must be
deemed to include (as it would at common law) anyone who held
title prior to the actual decree of forfeiture. "152 Justice Scalia
argued that the relation-back provision applies even to property
in which an innocent owner has an interest and that section
881(a)(6) does not insulate the property of innocent owners from
forfeiture: "it protects only the 'interest' of certain owners in any
153
of the described property."
Nonetheless, Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment because
of his belief that the relation-back doctrine, both at common law
and under the statute, becomes effective only after forfeiture is
decreed. 154 Thus, he agreed with Justice Stevens' view that the
government's reading of the relation-back provision would divest
title of even those persons who were eligible under the
government's limited reading of "innocent owner" as persons
who acquired the res prior to the unlawful act. What section
881(h) meant to Justice Scalia, is that title "'shall vest in the
United States upon forfeiture, effective as of commission of the
act giving rise to forfeiture.'" 155
In dissent, Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justice White, argued that the real issue was not whether the
claimant can assert an innocent owner defense, but that as a
donee, her title was inferior to the Government's title. 156 Justice
150. Id. at 1137.

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Id. at 1138-42 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id. at 1139 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id. at 1138-39 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id. at 1140 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id. at 1143 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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Kennedy maintained that under the voidable title provisions of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 157 the title to property obtained by a
donee is limited to the title possessed by the donor. 15 8 On the
other hand, a transferee who acquires money from a bona fide
purchaser or one of his successors obtains good title. 159 Thus,
one who has defective title can create a good title in a new holder
by a transfer for value. 160 However, Justice Kennedy insisted
that "the donee of drug trafficking proceeds has no valid claim to
the proceeds, not because she has done anything wrong but
because she stands in the shoes of one who has. It is the nature of
the donor's interest, which the donee has assumed, that renders
the property subject to forfeiture." 16 1 Justice Kennedy bemoaned
the plurality's opinion as leaving the forfeiture scheme "in quite a
mess," 162 and he believed that the plurality was "rip[ping] out
the most effective enforcement provisions in all of the drug
163
forfeiture laws."
The Court's substantial involvement in the 1992 Term with the
forfeiture issue has continued into the 1993 Term with United
States v. James Daniel Good Real Property.164 The issue in
Good is whether the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment1 65 entities a person to notice and an opportunity for
a hearing prior to seizure of real property. 166 The government
has argued that no advance notice for a seizure is required so
long as the government first obtains a warrant from a federal
magistrate. 167 The New York Times called the oral argument
"spirited."168
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

U.C.C. § 2-403(1) (1993).
92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. at 1144 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Id. (citation omitted) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1145 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1146 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
114 S. Ct. 492 (1993).
U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
James Daniel Good Real Property, 114 S. Ct. at 497.

167. United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 971 F.2d 1376,

1382 (9th Cir. 1992), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 114 S. Ct. 492 (1993).
Subsequent to the Symposium, the Court, in a 5-4 decision, held that absent
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m. THE HABEAS CORPUS CASES
The Court's three habeas corpus decisions had something for
everyone. For those who have been unhappy with the Court's
closing of federal courthouse doors to substantive issues, as in
Stone v. Powell,169 where state violations of the Fourth
Amendment 170 were barred, surprisingly, there was good news;
it came in Withrow v. Williams. 17 1
As you may recall, Stone v. Powell held that a federal habeas
corpus court could no longer entertain a state defendant's claim
that his conviction was the result of a state court's failure to
suppress evidence that was the product of an illegal search or
seizure. 172 The Stone Court had reasoned that the exclusionary
rule was not itself a personal constitutional right but was merely
a judicially created rule designed to effectuate the substantive
guarantees of the Fourth Amendment through deterrence of
police misconduct. 173 Consequently, so long as a defendant's
Fourth Amendment claims had been fully and fairly litigated in
the state courts, the refusal to suppress evidence by the state
courts did not furnish a basis for a writ of habeas corpus, since
no constitutional right of the defendant had been violated by nonsuppression. 174
The issue in Withrow was whether the Court would apply the
same analysis to a police failure to comply with the requirements
of Miranda v. Arizona. 175 Because the Court has frequently
stated that the Miranda warnings are not themselves a
exigent circumstances, the Due Process Clause requires the government to
afford notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard before seizing real

property subject to civil forfeiture. James Daniel Good Real Property, 114 S.
Ct. at 497.
168. Linda Greenhouse, Court Again Hears a Case on Seizure, N.Y.
TIMEs, Oct. 7, 1993, at A22.

169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

428 U.S. 465 (1976).
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
113 S. Ct. 1745 (1993).
Stone, 428 U.S. at 474-95.
Id. at 486.
Id. at 481-82.
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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constitutional right, 176 the prospect loomed large that the Court
would deny habeas availability to Miranda violations, as it had to
Fourth Amendment violations. By a vote of 5-4, the Court
decided the two situations were constitutionally different.
In Withrow, police officers in Romulus, Michigan contacted
Williams upon the belief that he had information regarding a
double murder. 177 Williams agreed to accompany the officers to
the police station for questioning. 178 At first, he denied
involvement but then began to incriminate himself. 17 9 The police
officers did not give Williams Miranda warnings and assured him
that they only wanted to learn who fired the fatal shots. 180 When
Williams continued to deny involvement, one of the officers
threatened to charge him and lock him up. 181 The tactic
succeeded as Williams admitted he had furnished the murder
weapon to the killer. 182 Only at this point, did the police give
Williams Miranda warnings. 183
The state courts found no Miranda violation. 184 The federal
district court disagreed, holding that the police had placed
Williams in custody for Miranda purposes when they threatened
to lock him up. 185 The Sixth Circuit affirmed, summarily

176. See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974) (stating that the
Miranda "procedural safeguards [are] not themselves rights protected by the
Constitution but are instead measures to insure that the right against
compulsory self-incrimination [is] protected"); see also Duckworth v. Eagan,
492 U.S. 195, 203 (1989); Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 528 (1987);
Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 305 (1985); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S.
649, 654 (1984).
177. Withrow, 113 S. Ct. at 1748.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 1749.
183. Id. Williams waived his Miranda rights and subsequently admitted to
driving the killer to the crime scene, witnessing the murders, and disposing of
incriminating evidence. Williams was formally charged with murder the next
day. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
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rejecting the state's argument that the Stone rule barred Williams'
Mirandaclaim. 186
Justice Souter, writing for the majority, agreed with the Sixth
Circuit. 18 7 He pointed out that previous efforts to extend Stone
188
beyond the Fourth Amendment context have been rejected,
and that there are meaningful distinctions between Fourth
Amendment claims and Miranda claims. 189 Stone, he explained,
was based on the proposition that the Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule is a "judicially crafted" remedy designed to
deter police misconduct and not "a personal constitutional
right." 190 He also pointed out that Stone recognized that the
application of the exclusionary rule on collateral review would
not meaningfully advance its deterrence rationale. 191 On the
other hand, the costs of applying the exclusionary rule on federal
habeas review were quite substantial; reliable evidence would be
excluded and friction between state and federal justice systems
would be created unnecessarily. 192 It was these "prudential
concerns" which, according to Justice Souter, led to the Stone
rule. 193

Miranda stands on an entirely different footing, Justice Souter
explained. 194 Accepting "for purposes of this case" the premise
that the Miranda rule is merely "prophylactic," 195 it nonetheless
safeguards a "'fundamental trial right"' -- the Fifth Amendment's

186. Williams v. Withrow, 944 F.2d 284, 291 (6th Cir. 1991), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part, 113 S. Ct. 1745 (1993).
187. Withrow, 113 S. Ct. at 1750-55.
188. Id. at 1750-51; see also Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365
(1986) (claim of ineffective assistance of counsel); Jackson v. Virginia, 443
U.S. 307 (1979) (claim of evidentiary insufficiency); Rose v. Mitchell, 443
U.S. 545 (1979) (equal protection claim in grand jury selection).
189. Withrow, 113 S.Ct. at 1750-55.

190. Id. at 1750; see also supra note 173 and accompanying text.
191. Withrow, 113 S. Ct. at 1750; see also supra note 173 and
accompanying text.
192.
193.
194.
195.

Withrow, 113 S.Ct. at 1750.
Id.
Id. at 1751-55.
Id. at 1752-53.
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guarantee 196 that "[Nuo person... shall be compelled in any

criminal case to be a witness against himself... "197
Moreover, he emphasized, Miranda guards against the possibility
that in-custody interrogation will yield unreliable testimony. 198
Thus, in contrast to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, the
value it serves is not "divorced from the correct ascertainment of
guilt."199

Justice Souter stressed also that by extending Stone to Miranda,
little would be gained towards reducing the workload of the
federal courts. 200 Miranda claims would simply be recast as due
process involuntariness claims inasmuch as the circumstances that
must be reviewed in determining voluntariness include the
presence or absence of Miranda warnings. 2 01 "We thus fail to

see," Justice Souter wrote, "how abdicating Miranda's brightline (or at least, brighter-line) rules in favor of an exhaustive
totality-of-circumstances approach on habeas would do much of
anything to lighten the burdens placed on busy federal
courts. "202

Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, dissented
in part, arguing that the "prudential concerns" adverted to in
Stone also counseled exclusion on habeas review of Miranda
claims. 203 She saw no distinction between the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule and suppression of statements
obtained in violation of Miranda.204 "Excluding Miranda claims
from habeas," she pointed out, "denies collateral relief only in
those cases in which the prisoner's statement was neither
compelled nor involuntary but merely obtained without the

196. Id. at 1753 (quoting United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S.
259, 264 (1990)).
197. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
198. Withrow, 113 S. Ct. at 1753.

199. Id.
200. Id.at 1754.

201. Id.
202. Id.

203. Id.at 1758-60 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
204. Id.at 1760-65 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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benefit of Miranda's prophylactic warnings." 205 She also
disputed Justice Souter's linkage of Miranda with the
trustworthiness of confessions. 20 6 To the extent that Miranda
protects against the use of involuntary and hence unreliable,
statements, federal courts can review the issue of voluntariness
directly, she pointed out. 207
Also dissenting in part, Justice Scalia, joined by Justice
Thomas, argued that federal habeas review should be precluded
as to any claim that has been fully and fairly litigated in state
court, unless the claimed error "goes to the fairness of the trial
process or the accuracy of the ultimate result." 20 8 Justice Scalia
also argued that habeas jurisdiction should be exercised in
accordance with equitable principles and that the fact of a prior
full and fair opportunity to litigate a claim is "the most powerful
209
equitable consideration" that can be advanced.
The Withrow decision again underscores how, with the current
Court, federal habeas corpus, "lives on the edge." By one vote,
the federal habeas door once again escaped a substantive
shutdown. Both the majority and the dissenters had creditable
positions. On one hand, there is strength to Justice O'Connor's
position that Miranda violations do not create a substantial risk of
untrustworthy statements by suspects, especially since
involuntariness claims would not be barred from review. But it
does not follow necessarily that if one accepts her argument,
Justice Souter's opinion unravels. The strength of his opinion lies
in its reminder that the privilege against self-incrimination, which
Miranda sought to safeguard, does not have the singular rationale
of merely protecting against untrustworthy statements. 2 10
205. Id. at 1761 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
206. Id. at 1761-64 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
207. Id. at 1764 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).

208. Id. at 1768 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
209. Id. at 1776 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
210. See STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & DANIEL J. CAPRA, AMERICAN
CRIMNAL PROCEDURE 446-48 (4th ed. 1992) (listing, in addition to a fear of
untrustworthiness, nine other rationales for the privilege against selfincrimination which, at one time or another, have found favor in judicial
writings).
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Withrow is an intriguing case. Despite the Court's hostility to
federal habeas corpus over the last 20 years, and no decision is
more hostile than Stone v. Powell, a majority of the Justices has
resisted all attempts to extend it. Certainly, there is no more
effective way to cabin federal habeas corpus than to bar relief
entirely as to a discrete substantive issue. The question persists as
to why Stone remains limited to Fourth Amendment claims. I do
not have the answer, and I am not driven to find one. That is
because I have never cared much for Stone v. Powell's preclusion
of Fourth Amendment claims. The logic of the majority opinion
has always escaped me. Given that Mapp v. Ohio2 11 recognized
the remedy of exclusion for violations of Fourth Amendment
guarantees, that it should be a remedy enforceable only in state
court and on a writ of certiorari has long struck me as irrational.
When one lives on the edge, of course, one can fall off. That is
exactly what happened in Brecht v. Abrahamson,2 12 in which the
Court again exhibited "forum-schizophrenia" as to constitutional
error, though in a form less severe than Stone v. Powell. This
time the Court, by a 5-4 vote, made it more difficult to secure
federal habeas corpus relief for a federal constitutional violation
than is required for state court review of the same violation. It
held that federal constitutional error can be deemed harmless
even if the habeas court, as required by Chapman v.
California,2 13 would not hold the error harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. 2 14 Instead, the error can be deemed harmless if
the court is satisfied that it did not have a "'substantial and
injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's
verdict. "215
Brecht was convicted of first degree murder in Wisconsin state
court. 2 16 At his trial, he admitted firing the fatal shot but claimed

211.
212.
213.
214.

367 U.S. 643 (1961).
113 S. Ct. 1710 (1993).
386 U.S. 18, 21-24 (1967).
Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1713-14.

215. Id. at 1714 (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776
(1946)).
216. Id. at 1715.
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it was an accident. 2 17 The prosecutor impeached him by pointing
out that he had failed to make such a claim before trial. 218 Some
of the silence to which the prosecutor referred came after Brecht
2 19
had been given Miranda warnings.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court acknowledged that the
prosecutor's references to post-Miranda warning periods of
silence violated the rule in Doyle v. Ohio,220 which precludes use
of a defendant's silence to impeach after he has been given
Mirandawarnings. 22 1 It held, however, that under the reasonable
doubt standard of Chapman, the test was satisfied. 222 The
Seventh Circuit reached the same result, but by a different
that the Doyle rule is merely
road. 223 Reasoning
"prophylactic," 224 the court held that the Chapman standard need
not be applied and that a less stringent test, as established in
Kotteakos v. United States,225 is warranted when federal habeas
review is sought; the test it applied was the federal standard used
226
for non-constitutional error.

Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, disagreed
with the Seventh Circuit as to the nature of a Doyle violation,
pointing out that Doyle did more than just extend Miranda
protections, which the Court has come to regard as
217. Id. at 1714.
218. Id. at 1714-15.
219. Id. at 1716.

220. 426 U.S. 610, 619 (1976) (holding "that the use for impeachment
purposes of petitioner's silence, at the time of arrest and after receiving
Miranda warnings, violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment").
221. State v. Brecht, 421 N.W.2d 96, 104 (Wis. 1988), rev'd sub nom.
Brecht v. Abrahamson, rev'd, 759 F. Supp. 500 (W.D. Wis. 1991), rev'd, 944
F.2d 1363 (7th Cir. 1991), aff'd, 113 S. Ct. 1710 (1993).
222. Id.

223. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 944 F.2d 1363 (7th Cir. 1991), aff'd, 113 S.
Ct. 1710 (1993).
224. Id. at 1370.

225. 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946) (questioning whether it is "highly probable
that the error had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining
the jury's verdict").
226. Brecht, 944 F.2d at 1375.
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prophylaxes. 227 Doyle violations, he said, were true
constitutional violations because Doyle is rooted in concerns of
fundamental fairness and due process. 228 Therefore, Doyle error
"fits squarely" into the category of constitutional violations
which the Court, in Arizona v. Fulminante,2 29 classified as "trial
error."

230

However, Rehnquist pointed out that the Seventh Circuit,
though off-base in its understanding of Doyle, arrived nonetheless
at the correct harmless error standard - Kotteakos rather than
Chapman.2 31 Chapman, he explained, reached the Court through
direct appeal and even though the Court has applied the Chapman
"harmless error" standard "in a handful of federal habeas cases,"
it had not yet squarely addressed "its applicability on collateral
review. "232
Rehnquist emphasized that the Court has treated collateral
review differently from direct review 233 and has in fact used
different standards on habeas review than would be applied to
some matters on direct review. 234 A prime example of this, he
said, is the Court's according retroactive effect to constitutional
rulings which always apply retroactively to cases on direct
review, but seldom on habeas. 235 The main reason for this
difference, Rehnquist asserted, is "the State's interest in the
finality of convictions" that have come to the end of the direct
review process. 23 6 The same interest, he maintained, mandates a
lesser harmless error standard on collateral review:
"[o]vertuming final and presumptively correct convictions on
collateral review because the State cannot prove that an error is
harmless under Chapman undermines the States' interest in
227. Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1717.

228. Id.
229. 499 U.S. 279, 307-10 (1991).
230. Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1717.
231. Id. at 1716-19.
232. Id. at 1718.

233. Id. at 1719-20.
234. Id. at 1720-21.
235. Id. at 1720.
236. Id.
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finality and infringes upon their sovereignty over criminal
matters. "237
The Chief Justice also argued that given the state courts have
equal, and perhaps, greater ability to evaluate the effect of trial
error, it "scarcely seems logical" to require that habeas courts
rehash the case using the same approach as did the state
courts. 238 Allowing the use of a less stringent standard on habeas
review will not tempt state prosecutors to step out of line or state
courts to lower their guard. 239 Moreover, "[t]he imbalance of the
costs and benefits of applying the Chapman harmless-error
standard on collateral review counsels in favor of applying a less
onerous standard on habeas review of constitutional error. The
Kotteakos standard," Rehnquist concluded, "fills the bill." 240 In
a footnote, he left open the possibility that the Kotteakos standard
might not be appropriate "in an unusual case" involving "a
deliberate and especially egregious error of the trial type, or one
that is combined with a pattern of prosecutorial
misconduct ... "241
Justice Stevens joined the majority opinion but he also issued a
concurrence in which he emphasized that the Kotteakos standard
forbids "a single-minded focus on how the error may (or may
not) have affected the jury's verdict. "242 Noting that Kotteakos
calls for a de novo review of the trial record, and that the burden
of showing harmlessness rests on the state, the Kotteakos
24 3
standard "is appropriately demanding," he concluded.
Justice White, joined by Justice Blackmun and, for the most
part, by Justice Souter, argued that there is no reason argued to
have two standards for harmless constitutional error: 244 "[e]ither
state courts are faithful to federal law, in which case there is no
cost in applying the Chapman as opposed to the Kotteakos
237. Id. at 1721.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 1721-22.

241. Id. at 1722 n.9.
242. Id. at 1724 (Stevens, J., concurring).
243. Id. at 1723 (Stevens, J., concurring).

244. Id. at 1725-28 (White, J., dissenting).
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standard on collateral review; or they are not, and it is precisely
the role of habeas corpus to rectify that situation." 245

Justice O'Connor dissented, not because collateral review is
different from direct review but because the majority was
painting with too broad a brush. 246 In her view, "the harmlesserror standard often will be inextricably intertwined with the
interest of reliability." 247 Therefore, "where errors bearing on
accuracy are at issue," she was "not persuaded that the Kotteakos
248
standard offers an adequate assurance of reliability."
This case, arguably, is even less sensible than Stone v.
Powell.249 It is one thing to say that collateral review makes a
difference when the implicated "right" is not of constitutional
stature, as was the case in Stone, and quite something else to say
that when a constitutional right is violated, a defendant's right to
a new trial is contingent on which court has so determined. A
reality check on the harmless error doctrine would reveal that
even the Chapman standard is frequently utilized by appellate
courts to affirm convictions unjustifiedly. 250 To allow further

245. Id. at 1728 (White, J., dissenting).
246. Id. at 1728-32 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
247. Id. at 1730 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
248. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
249. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
250. See Steven H. Goldberg, Harmless Error: ConstitutionalSneak Thief,
71 J. CRiM. L. & CRMNOLOGY 421 (1980). The author argues that
"[a]lthough Chapman introduced the harmless constitutional error, the doctrine
as presented possessed only the potential, not the doctrinal structure, for
constitutional and institutional mischief." Id. at 426. This test was to be
stringent, and instead the Supreme Court and appellate courts have not
interpreted "Chapman to allow a finding of harmlessness only after an
appellate court had examined the error alone and found beyond a reasonable
doubt that it could not have contributed to the verdict." Id. The reviewing
courts have focused on the entire transcript to find guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt despite the constitutional error, rather than concentrating solely on the
constitutional right at issue. Id. at 427-32. "As a result, the doctrine has
become a major thief of constitutional rights without any particular notice or
analysis." Id. at 427; Steven A. Saltzburg, The Harm of Harmless Error, 59
VA. L. REv. 988 (1973). The author proposes an alternative test be applied by
appellate courts to determine if a trial error has affected the verdict, rather
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slippage by permitting an even lower standard seems to have
little justification other than in the Court's general hostility to
habeas corpus. It is a hostility which is not shared by
Congress 25 1 and is one which, in Justice White's words, has
produced a habeas jurisprudence that "is taking on the
appearance of a confused patchwork in which different
constitutional rights are treated according to their status, ... [a]
picture [that] bears scant resemblance either to Congress' design
252
or to our own precedents."
In Herrerav. Collins,253 the truism that "facts drive the law"
may have had its epiphany. The issue was whether, in the face of
an allegation that a person is innocent of the murder for which he
was sentenced to death, the Eighth Amendment's 254 prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment and the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause 255 forbid execution. 25 6 The
majority opinion, 257 written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, said
"no" but "maybe." The dissent 258 said the "maybe" meant "yes,
but not now" and that the majority's "no" was, therefore,
dictum. Because the facts of the case could not sustain Herrera's
constitutional claims, the case proved an unsuitable vehicle for
resolution of an issue of such moment.
Herrera was charged with the murder of two police officers,
Rucker and Carrisalez. 259 In January, 1982, after his trial for
Carrisalez's murder, he was convicted and sentenced to death. 260
In July, 1982, he pleaded guilty to Rucker's murder. 26 1 He lost
his challenges to his conviction both on direct appeal and in state
than the Chapman test which unjustifiably distinguishes between constitutional
and nonconstitutional issues. d.
251. See Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1727 (White, J., dissenting).
252. Id. at 1728 (White, J., dissenting).
253. 113 S. Ct. 853 (1993).
254. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.

255. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.

Id. at 859.
Id. at 856-70.
Id. at 876-84 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id. at 857.
Id.
Id.
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collateral proceedings in the Texas courts. 2 62 He was also
unsuccessful with a federal habeas corpus petition. 2 63 In
February 1992, a decade after his conviction, he filed a second
federal habeas petition alleging that he was "actually
innocent." 264 In support of his claim, he submitted affidavits
tending to show that his now-dead brother, rather than he, had
murdered the two officers. 2 6 5
The
evidence
at Herrera's
trial,
however,
was
266
overwhelming.
Officer Hernandez, who had witnessed
2 67
Carrisalez's slaying, identified Herrera as the shooter.
Carrisalez's own dying declaration did the same. 268 The speeding
car involved in Carrisalez's murder was registered to Herrera's
live-in girlfriend; also, Herrera was known to drive the car and
he had a set of keys to the car on him when arrested. 2 69 Officer
Hernandez identified the car and testified that there had been only
one person in it the night of the shooting. 2 70 Herrera's social
security card was found alongside Rucker's patrol car, and type
A blood which Rucker but not Herrera had, was found on
Herrera's jeans and wallet. 27 1 Strands of Rucker's hair were
found in Herrera's car and a handwritten letter strongly implying
Herrera as Officer Rucker's killer, was found on Herrera when
he was arrested. 272
Given these facts, it is not surprising that Chief Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the Court, rejected Herrera's claims and
held that neither the prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment nor due process was violated by the refusal to
entertain Herrera's actual innocence claim. 273 Rehnquist cited
262. Id. at 858.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id.

266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.

Id. at 857.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 862-65.
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Chief Justice Warren for the proposition that "'the existence
merely of newly discovered evidence relevant to the guilt of a
state prisoner is not a ground for relief on federal habeas
corpus.'274 This proposition, Rehnquist reminded us, "is
grounded in the principle that federal habeas courts sit to ensure
that individuals are not imprisoned in violation of the
Constitution--not to correct errors of fact." 275 Federal habeas
court review of evidentiary matters, he pointed out, is limited
under Jackson v. Virginia,276 to the question of whether the
evidence meets minimum due process standards, not whether the
federal court would reach the same conclusion as the state
court. 277 While "actual innocence" may allow for an exception to
the rule precluding federal courts from consideration of abusive
or successive petitions, it "is not itself a constitutional claim, but
instead a gateway through which a habeas petitioner must pass to
have his otherwise barred constitutional claim considered on the
merits. " 2

78

The Chief Justice also emphasized that there is no due process
right to an unlimited opportunity to move for a new trial on the
basis of newly discovered evidence and that there have always
been time limits on such motions. 279 Texas' 30-day limit is
280
consistent, he said, with this tradition.
If I might digress for a moment. I find this dictum more
troubling than anything else in the opinion. Even in non-capital
cases, the idea of a 30-day limit for newly discovered evidence
strikes me as abhorrent and possibly unacceptable as a matter of
due process. Herrera's case was not appropriate for litigation of
274. Id. at 860 (quoting Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 317 (1963)).
275. Id. (citations omitted).
276. 443 U.S. 307 (1979).
277. Herrera, 113 S.Ct. at 861.
278. Id. at 862.
279. Id. at 864-66.
280. Id. at 865-66. The Court noted that 17 States require a motion for new
trial based on the ground of newly discovered evidence within 60 days or less
of the judgment. Id. In fact, some States, such as Hawaii and Tennessee,
require such motion to be made within ten days of the judgment. Id. at 865
n.8.
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this issue since the alleged new evidence was ten years late. But
what about newly discovered evidence that tends to exculpate a
defendant with 31 or 60 days or even a year of his conviction? Is
it so clear that the Constitution affords no remedy for such
arbitrariness when life or liberty are at stake?
To return to Herrera. Despite the holding of the case, the
majority did state that "[w]e may assume, for the sake of
argument in deciding this case, that in a capital case a truly
persuasive demonstration of 'actual innocence' made after trial
would render the execution of a defendant unconstitutional, and
warrant federal habeas relief if there were no state avenue open
to process such a claim." 28 1 What quantum of evidence as to

"actual innocence" would trigger acceptance by the Court, we do
not know. But I am very happy the Court said what it did.
Precisely because there are jurisdictions, such as Texas, with
extremely short time limitations on newly-discovered evidence,
even a slight window of opportunity for a condemned man or
woman is welcome.
The Chief Justice's opinion did, however, send some sparks
flying, even amongst the majority. Justice O'Connor, joined by
Justice Kennedy, observed that on the facts presented, Herrera
could not be considered "innocent" in any respect. 282 Therefore,
while she believed that "the execution of a legally and factually
innocent person would be a constitutionally intolerable
event,... [riesolving the issue is neither necessary nor advisable
283
in this case."

Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, would have preferred
that the Court hold squarely that the Constitution does not require
"judicial consideration of newly discovered evidence of
innocence." 284 True to form, he observed that "[tihere is no
basis in text, tradition, or even in contemporary practice ...

for

finding in the Constitution a right to demand judicial
consideration of newly discovered evidence brought forward after
281.
282.
283.
284.

Id. at 869.
Id. at 870 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Id. at 870-71 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Id. at 874 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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conviction."285 Nonetheless, he joined the majority's opinion
"because there is no legal error in deciding a case by assuming
arguendo that an asserted constitutional right exists... ," and
because "it is improbable that evidence of innocence as
convincing as today's opinion requires would fail to produce an
executive pardon." '2 86 One can ask whether all share Justice
Scalia's abiding faith in executive authority.
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Stevens and Souter,
argued that the execution of an innocent person would violate
both the Eighth Amendment and substantive due process. 2 87
Most of the majority opinion, he stated, was dictum because the
case was actually decided on the assumption that the Constitution
does prohibit execution of innocents. 288 As to what standard
would be appropriate for an "actual innocence" claim, Justice
Blackmun opted for a requirement that the petitioner must show
that he is "probably innocent." 289
Herrera is unfinished business. It offers little guidance for
lower courts in resolving claims of actual innocence. The
majority has left the door ajar, however slightly, but the message
is that a defendant had better not seek entry unless he really has
the goods. How much is enough is left unsaid. Justice White's
brief concurrence may provide a possible benchmark in its
suggestion that an actual innocence claimant would, at the very
least, have to meet the Jackson v. Virginia2 90 standard -- "that

based on proffered newly discovered evidence and the entire
record before the jury that convicted him 'no rational trier of fact
could [find] proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.' "291 The
question remains whether the majority would require even more
than that--whatever that could be or whether, in a capital case,
the Jackson standard is all that the Constitution requires.
285. Id. at 874-75 (Scalia, J., concurring).
286. Id. at 875 (Scalia, J., concurring).
287. Id. at 876-84 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
288. Id. at 876 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
289. Id. at 878 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
290. 443 U.S. 307 (1979).
291. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 875 (White, J., concurring) (quoting Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 321 (1979)).
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IV. DOUBLE JEOPARDY
In United States v. Dixon,2 92 a judicial act of infanticide
occurred. Only three years old, the life of Grady v. Corbin,293
was snuffed out by the dissenters in that case and the concurrence
of Justice Thomas. To dispose of the body, the Justices leveled
the most trees and produced the most complicated set of opinions
in any criminal case of the Term.
As you may recall, Grady held that the Double Jeopardy
Clause 2 94 bars a second prosecution where the government seeks
"to establish an essential element of an offense charged in that
prosecution, [which] will prove conduct that constitutes an
offense for which the defendant has already been prosecuted." 295
The Grady "same-conduct" test added an additional level of
proof for the government to meet beyond that required by the
"same-elements" test of Blockburger v. United States.2 96 Under
the Blockburger test, the inquiry is whether each offense contains
an element not contained in the other; if not, they are the "same
offense" within the Double Jeopardy Clause's meaning, and
subsequent punishment or prosecution is barred. 2 97
In Dixon, the broad issue before the Court was whether
someone who previously received a contempt-of-court prison
sentence can be criminally prosecuted for the same conduct. 298
The Court answered that it depends. In one of the two cases
consolidated on appeal, Dixon had been granted bail on condition
that he not commit "any criminal offense." 29 9 While on release,
he was arrested and indicted for possessing cocaine with intent to
distribute. 300 He was found guilty of criminal contempt based on
292. 113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993).
293. 495 U.S. 508 (1990), overrded by United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct.
2849 (1993).
294. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
295. Grady, 495 U.S. at 510.
296. 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
297.
298.
299.
300.

Id. at 304.
Dixon, 113 S. Ct. at 2854.
Id. at 2853.
Id.
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the drug offense. 30 1 In the other case, Foster was under a civil
protection order that he not "molest, assault, or in any manner
threaten or physically abuse" his estranged wife. 302 In a multicount contempt proceeding prosecuted by his wife's attorney,
Foster was charged with violating the order by way of several
assaults and several threats. 303 He was convicted on some of the
contempt counts and acquitted on others. 304 He was later indicted
for simple assault, multiple counts of threatening to injure
another, and assault with intent to kill--all based on the events
underlying the contempt prosecution. 305
Justice Scalia, who wrote the lead opinion, concluded that the
Blockburger test was the only appropriate one. 306 He reprised his
Grady dissent in which he had argued that the Grady test lacked
constitutional roots, that it was "wholly inconsistent with earlier
Supreme Court precedent" and was at odds with "the clear
common-law understanding of double jeopardy. '"307 Moreover,
the Grady rule, he argued, has already proved unstable in
application, and should be overruled. 30 8 Five justices agreed that
Grady should go 309 but only Justice Kennedy joined Justice
Scalia's opinion as to the application of the Blockburger test to
the facts at bar. 3 10
Under Justice Scalia's application of Blockburger to the Dixon
facts, when a court order incorporates a criminal statute and the
defendant is then found in contempt for violating the order
through commission of the incorporated offense, a subsequent
prosecution directly under the statute constitutes double

301. Id.
302. Id. at 2854.
303. Id.

304. Id.
305. Id.
306. Id. at 2860.

307. Id. (citing Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 526 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting)).
308. Id.
309. Id. at 2865 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
310. Id. at 2852.
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jeopardy. 3 11 In that instance, the contempt offense included all
elements of the drug offense and the contempt order incorporated
the entire criminal code. 3 12 Thus, the crime charged in Dixon's
indictment was necessarily a "species of lesser-included offense"
in relation to the contempt offense, and under Harris v.
Oklahoma,313 successive prosecutions for greater and lesser
14

offenses are prohibited. 3
As to Foster, Justice Scalia concluded that the simple assault
charge failed the Blockburger test and thus was a double jeopardy
violation. 3 15 However, the charges of threatening and assault
with intent to kill were not barred. 316 Assault with intent to kill
includes the element of specific intent, but the related contempt
offense does not;3 17 on the other hand, the contempt offense
requires knowledge of the protection order, which assault with
intent to kill does not. 3 18 Under Grady, the charges left standing
by Blockburger would be barred because to prove the criminal
offense, the government proved the same conduct that constituted
the contempt. 3 19 With Grady's interment, there was no longer a
double jeopardy violation.
Justice Souter wrote the major doctrinal defense of Grady.320
He pointed out that the Double Jeopardy Clause operates
differently depending on whether the context is one of successive
prosecutions or of multiple punishments. 32 1 When the issue is
whether multiple punishments may be imposed for a single act, it
is constitutionally sufficient to determine whether the legislature
intended multiple punishments or not. 322 However, where
311. Id. at 2856-57 (citing Harris v. Oklahoma, 433 U.S. 682 (1987) (per
curiam)).
312. Id.

313. 433 U.S. 682 (1987).
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.

Dixon, 113 S. Ct. at 2857 (citations omitted).
Id. at 2858.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2859.

319. Id. at 2859-60.
320. Id. at 2881-91 (Souter, J., concurring).
321. Id. at 2881 (Souter, J., concurring).
322. Id. at 2881-82 (Souter, J., concurring).
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successive prosecutions are at issue, the interests at stake are
different because "[tihe protection against successive

prosecutions is the central protection provided by the Clause." 323
In this context, Justice Souter pointed out, the Double Jeopardy
Clause prevents the government from "'makjing] repeated
attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby
subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and
compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and
insecurity.'"324 Thus, "while the government may punish a

person separately for each conviction of at least as many offenses
as meet the Blockburger test," Justice Souter stated, "we have
long held that it must sometimes bring its prosecutions for these
offenses together. "325
"The
limitation
on successive
prosecution," he argued, "is thus a restriction on the government
different in kind from that contained in the limitation on multiple
punishments, and the government cannot get around the
restriction on repeated prosecution of a single individual merely
by precision in the way it defines its statutory offenses. "326
It is difficult to assess which side in Dixon has the better of the
argument as to the overruling of Grady. One has to parse the
cited precedents carefully. Justice Souter grounds his argument in
3 28
precedents such as In re Nielsen, 32 7 Harris v. Oklahoma,
323. Id. at 2882 (Souter, J., concurring).
324. Id. at 2883 (Souter, J., concurring) (quoting Green v. United States,
355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957)).
325. Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
326. Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
327. 131 U.S. 176 (1889). Justice Souter reflected on the holding of In Re
Nielson by stating that where "'a person has been tried and convicted for a
crime which has various incidents included in it, he cannot be a second time
tried for one of those incidents without being twice put in jeopardy for the
same offense.'" Dixon, 113 S. Ct. at 2885 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting In
re Nielsen, 131 U.S. at 188). Justice Souter noted that In re Nielsen's mention
of the common rule barring subsequent prosecution for lesser-included offenses
has "mislead[] the majority into thinking that Nielsen does nothing more than
apply the familiar rule which is, of course, a corollary to the Blockburger
test." Id. at 2886 (Souter, J., dissenting).
328. 433 U.S. 682 (1977). Justice Souter found that "the analysis in Harris
turned on considering the prior conviction in terms of the conduct actually
charged. While that process might be viewed as a misapplication of a
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Brown v. Ohio,32 9 and Illinois v. Vitale. 330 Justice Scalia says

they are either distinguishable, mere dicta, or are misdescribed
by Justice Souter. 33 1 Perhaps, if overruling Grady had clarified

double jeopardy jurisprudence measurably, Dixon would be
welcome. However, we are merely restored to the Blockburger
test, with which there had been considerable dissatisfaction to
begin with. 332 The easiest out in Dixon may well have been to
treat contempt differently from traditional criminal conduct and
thereby place it outside the protection of the Double Jeopardy
Clause entirely.

V. COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL
In Godinez v. Moran,333 the Court addressed an issue that had
divided a number of lower federal courts: 334 whether a defendant
Blockburger lesser-included-offense analysis, the crucial point is that the
Blockburger elements test would have produced a different result." Dixon, 113
S. Ct. at 2887 (Souter, J., dissenting).
329. 432 U.S. 161 (1977). Justice Souter recognized that "'[t]he
Blockburger test is not the only standard for determining whether successive
prosecutions impermissibly involve the same offense. Even if two offenses are
sufficiently different to permit the imposition of consecutive sentences,
successive prosecutions will be barred in some circumstances where the second
prosecution requires relitigation of factual issues already resolved by the
first.'" Dixon, 113 S. Ct. at 2886-87 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting Brown,
432 U.S. at 166-67 n.6).
330. 447 U.S. 410 (1980). Justice Souter evaluated the Court's opinion in
Vitale to indicate that an application of the Blockburger test would perhaps
allow a claim for double jeopardy to stand even where the two offenses were
not the "same." Dixon, 113 S. Ct. at 2887 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice
Souter noted that the Court, in Vitale, vacated and remanded the case for
determination of whether the elements of the lesser offense were always
necessarily included within the elements of the greater offense charged. Id. at
2888 (Souter, J., dissenting).
331. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. at 2860-63.
332. See Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508 (1990). Whatever the
shortcomings of Blockburger, some commentators believed those of Grady
were worse. See, e.g., Daniel J. Capra, Prisoners of Their Own
Jurisprudence:Fourth and Fifth Amendment Cases in the Supreme Court, 36
VILL. L. REV. 1267 (1991).
333. 113 S.Ct. 2680 (1993).
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who seeks to waive his right to a trial or his right to the
assistance of counsel must show a higher level of mental
functioning than mere competence to stand trial. 335 Justice
Thomas, writing for the majority, said no. 336 Justice Blackmun,
337
joined by Justice Stevens, dissented.
Moran pleaded not guilty to three counts of first degree murder
and two psychiatrists concluded that he was competent to stand
trial. 338 He then requested from the Nevada trial court that his
339
attorneys be discharged and his pleas be changed to guilty.
The court found that Moran understood the nature of the charges
against him, that he was able to assist in his own defense, that he
was knowingly and intelligently waiving his right to counsel and
that his guilty pleas were freely and voluntarily given. 340 Moran
34 1
was then sentenced to death.
Moran challenged his conviction and the trial court, after
holding an evidentiary hearing, rejected his claim that he was
"mentally incompetent to represent himself." 342 The Nevada
Supreme Court dismissed his appeal and Moran fared no better in
federal district court on his habeas corpus petition. 343 However,
the Ninth Circuit held that the state trial court's determination
was based on the wrong standard and that a new hearing should
be held. 344 The court reasoned that while a defendant is
competent to stand trial if he has "a rational and factual
understanding of the proceedings and is capable of assisting his
counsel," (the Dusky standard), 345 he is competent to waive
334. Id. at 2684-85 n.5.
335. Id. at 2682.
336. Id. at 2682-88.
337. Id. at 2691-96 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
338. Id. at 2682.
339. Id. at 2683.
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. Id.
343. Id.
344. Moran v. Godinez, 972 F.2d 263, 265-66 (9th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 113
S. Ct. 2680 (1993).
345. See Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (per curiam)

(stating the test for competency to stand trial as a "sufficient present ability to
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counsel or plead guilty only if he has the "capacity for 'reasoned
choice'" among competing alternatives. 346
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the competency
standard for pleading guilty or waiving the right to counsel is the
same as the competency standard for standing trial and that there
is no reason for treating the competency standard for either of
those decisions differently than that required for standing trial.347
Justice Thomas maintained that the decision to plead guilty,
though profound, "is no more complicated than the sum total of
decisions that a defendant may be called upon to make during the
course of a trial," such as whether to testify, whether to waive a
jury trial, and whether to cross-examine witnesses for the
prosecution. 34 8 Nor does "the decision to waive counsel," he
concluded, "require[ an appreciably higher level of mental
functioning than the decision to waive other constitutional
rights."349

In 1966, in Westbrook v. Arizona, 350 the Court vacated a
conviction, although the accused was found competent to stand
trial, because there had been no inquiry into his competency to
waive his right to counsel. The Ninth Circuit, as had some other
federal courts, read Westbrook to mean that a standard higher
than the Dusky standard was required for a waiver of the counsel
right. 35 1 Justice Thomas wrote that this was not the meaning of
Westbrook.352 Rather, the "competence to waive" language was
simply a "shorthand for the 'intelligent and competent waiver'
requirement of Johnson v. Zerbst."353 Consequently, said Justice
Thomas, "Westbrook stands only for the unremarkable
consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding"
and that the defendant has "a rational as well as factual understanding of the
proceedings against him").
346. Moran, 972 F.2d at 266.
347. Godinez, 113 S. Ct. at 2686.

348. Id.
349. Id.
350.
351.
352.
353.

384 U.S. 150, 150-51 (1966).
Godinez, 113 S. Ct. at 2685.
Id.
Id. at 2688; see also Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468 (1938).
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proposition that when a defendant seeks to waive his right to
counsel, a determination that he is competent to stand trial is not
enough; the waiver must also be intelligent and voluntary before
it can be accepted. "354
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Stevens, dissented,
disputing that "a defendant who is found competent to stand trial
with the assistance of an attorney is, ipso facto, competent to
discharge counsel and represent himself."35 5 He argued that the
Court's prior rulings recognized that "competency evaluations"
should be "specifically tailored to the context and purpose of a
proceeding ....

A person who is 'competent' to play basketball
is not thereby 'competent' to play the violin. "356 Thus, the

"reasoned choice" standard adopted by the Ninth Circuit, was
warranted. 357
Justice Blackmun's position seems more consonant with
contemporary legal and psychological perspectives as to a
person's varied mental level of functioning within a criminal trial
setting. The ABA's Standards for Criminal Justice recognize
different functional tests for various stages of the criminal
process. 358 For example, Standard 7-5.3(d)(iii) provides that
"[i]f, after [a] hearing, the court should determine that the
defendant is competent to stand trial but is incompetent to waive
counsel and to proceed without [the] assistance of counsel, the
court should appoint counsel to represent the defendant and
should proceed to trial of the case." 359 The American Psychiatric
Association and a number of other "mental health associations
filed an amicus brief on Moran's behalf, pointing out that mental

354. Godinez, 113 S. Ct. at 2688.

355. Id. at 2694 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
356. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
357. Id. at 2695 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
358. See ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS § 75.3(d)(iii) (1989).
359. ABA CRIMnNAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS § 7-5.3(d)(iii)
(1989).
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health professionals are capable of evaluating degrees of
competence as it pertains to trial competency." 3 60
In assessing whether the majority or the dissent has the better
of the argument, it is worth noting that at the very outset of his
opinion, Justice Thomas expressed skepticism as to whether there
existed a significant difference between the Dusky standard and
the Ninth Circuit's "reasoned choice" standard. 3 61 Although he
concluded that even if there was, it would not make a difference
constitutionally, 362 it seems clear that Justice Thomas' skepticism

pointed the way. If that skepticism was falsely based, as is
suggested by professional opinion, the majority's rejection of the
"reasoned choice" standard is less persuasive.
VI. JURY REASONABLE DOUBT INSTRUCTIONS AND
HARMLESS ERROR
In Sullivan v. Louisiana,363 the trial judge, in a prosecution for
first-degree murder and armed robbery, instructed the jury that
"reasonable doubt" was a doubt that "would give rise to a grave
uncertainty," one that would make the jury feel that it did not
have an abiding conviction of the defendant's guilt "to a moral
certainty," and one that could be described as "substantial" and
"serious doubt, for which you could give good reason." 364 In
Cage v. Louisiana,365 the Supreme Court had already
disapproved such a definition of reasonable doubt. The Louisiana
Supreme Court acknowledged that the charge was bad under
Cage, but held that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. 3 66

360. Sheila Taub, Competency Standard Clarified, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 18,
1993, at 25, 29.
361. Godinez, 113 S.Ct. at 2686.
362. 1d.
363. 113 S.Ct. 2078 (1993).
364. Louisiana v. Sullivan, 596 So. 2d 177, 185 n.3 (La. 1992), rev'd, 113
S. Ct. 2078 (1993).
365. 498 U.S. 39 (1990) (per curiam).
366. Sullivan, 596 So. 2d at 185.
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In a unanimous opinion by Justice Scalia, the Court held that a
reasonable doubt instruction which is constitutionally deficient is
not harmless error. 367 Justice Scalia explained that two
"interrelated" constitutional guarantees are implicated when a
jury is given an incorrect definition of reasonable doubt: the
Sixth Amendment 368 right to a jury verdict, and the Fifth
Amendment 369 requirement of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt. 370 The most important element of the Sixth Amendment
guarantee is that "the jury, rather than the judge, [must] reach the
requisite finding of 'guilty.'" 3 7 1 When the Fifth Amendment
guarantee is factored in, "the jury verdict required by the Sixth
Amendment is a jury verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. " 372

Justice Scalia pointed out that Chapman v. California,373 the
very case which rejected the view that all constitutional errors
were reversible error, 374 suggested the answer in this case. 375
Under the Chapman analysis, he said, a reviewing court must
consider what effect the error in question actually had on the
verdict--not its likely effect on a hypothetical reasonable jury. 376
However, because of the constitutionally deficient instruction
Sullivan's jury was given, the jury could be said to have found
nothing "beyond a reasonable doubt." 377 Thus, there was no jury
verdict in the case within the meaning of the Sixth
Amendment. 37 8 Consequently, the entire premise of harmless
error review is absent:

367. Sullivan, 113 S. Ct. at 2080-83.
368. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

369. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
370. Sullivan, 113 S.Ct. at 2081.
371. Id. at 2080.
372. Id. at 2081.
373. 386 U.S. 18 (1967)

374. Id. at 24 (stating that constitutional error will be harmless error unless
the court declares it was "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt").
375.
376.
377.
378.

Sullivan, 113 S.Ct. at 2081.
Id. at 2081-82; see also Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24.
Sullivan, 113 S.Ct. at 2082.
Id.
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There being no jury verdict of guilty-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt,
the question whether the same verdict of guilty-beyond-areasonable-doubt... would have been rendered absent the
constitutional error is utterly meaningless. There is no object, so
to speak, upon which harmless-error scrutiny can operate. The
most an appellate court can conclude is that a jury would surely
have found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt-not that
the jury's actual finding of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt
would surely not have been different absent the constitutional
error. That is not enough .... The Sixth Amendment requires
more than appellate speculation about a hypothetical jury's
action, or else directed verdicts for the State would be
sustainable on appeal; it requires an actual jury finding of
9
guilty. 37
Justice Scalia pointed to the distinction between a faulty
reasonable doubt charge and a jury instruction error that erects a
presumption regarding an element of the offense 380 -which the
Court has held is subject to harmless error analysis. 3 81 In the
presumption case, the jury does find facts beyond a reasonable
doubt, and "[a] reviewing court may thus be able to conclude that
the presumption prayed no significant role in the finding of
guilt .. . "382 He also found support in the analytical framework
of Arizona v. Fulminante,383 in which the Court drew a
distinction between structural defects and mere trial errors. 3 84 A
379. Id. (citations omitted).
380. Id.; see also Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979) (holding that
an instruction to the jury in a homicide case that "the law presumes that a
person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts" violated the
Due Process Clause because it may have removed from the prosecution its
burden of proving every element of the offense).
381. Sullivan, 113 S. Ct. at 2082; cf Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570 (1986)

(holding a Sandstrom error may be harmless); but see Francis v. Franklin, 471
U.S. 307, 325-26 (1985) (finding no harmless error where intent was plainly at
issue and the "evidence of intent was far from overwhelming" in the case).
382. Sullivan, 113 S. Ct. at 2082.

383. 499 U.S. 279, 307-10 (1991) (finding an involuntary confession to be a
'trial error' subject to harmless-error analysis, while deprivation of counsel to
be a 'structural defect' which affects the entire conduct of the trial and defies
harmless-error analysis).
384. Sullivan, 113 S. Ct. at 2082-83.
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deficient instruction on reasonable doubt, he stated, is a structural
defect and is not susceptible, therefore, to harmless error
analysis. 3 85
Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote a separate concurrence in which
he expressed doubt that an erroneous reasonable doubt instruction
is actually very different from instructions embodying
unconstitutional presumptions. 386 He stated that "[o]ne may
question whether ...

the ability to conduct harmless-error

review is dependent on the existence of 'beyond a reasonable
doubt' jury findings" in view of the fact that "jur[ies] doo not
[usually] make explicit factual findings." 387
Given the Court's predilection for limiting the kinds of
constitutional error that are immune to harmless error analysis,
the Sullivan decision in counter-intuitive. However, in light of
what remains after Fulminante, it is a decision of limited
consequence. Fulminante's "structural defect" demarcation has
left little on the no harmless-error analysis side of the ledger.
When the Court in Fulminante held that harmless error analysis
may be applied to coerced confessions, a constitutional Rubicon
of sorts was crossed.
VII. SENTENCING
In Godfather III, Al Pacino, as the aging Don, remonstrates
that "Just when I thought I was out of it, they pull me back in."
The same can be said as to the Supreme Court and the sentencing
process, thanks to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. 388 The
Court's decisions this Term reflect that it will be in the
sentencing business for a long time. After all, why should the
Court be free when, in some circuit courts of appeal, sentencing
issues infect as much as a half of the court's criminal docket?
385. Id.

386. Id. at 2083-84 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
387. Id. at 2084 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
388. See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION,

FEDERAL SENTENCING

GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3C1.1 (Nov. 1989); UNITED STATES SENTENCING
COMMISSION, FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2 (Nov.

1992).
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In United States v. Dunnigan,389 Justice Kennedy, writing for
a unanimous Court, answered affirmatively to the question
"whether the Constitution permits a court to enhance a
defendant's sentence under [section 3C1.1 of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines] 390 if the court finds the defendant
committed perjury at trial." 39 1
At Dunnigan's trial, the government presented numerous
eyewitnesses who testified to her dealings in cocaine. 392 She took
the stand and denied her guilt. 393 After the jury convicted her,
the court found that she had deliberately given false testimony
with respect to material matters in order to substantially affect the
outcome of the case and her offense level was increased two
4
levels under section 3C1.1.39
The Fourth Circuit reversed Dunnigan's enhanced sentence. 395
It distinguished United States v. Grayson396 which held that a
judge could, in fixing upon a sentence, constitutionally consider
its belief that a defendant lied on the stand. 397 The Fourth Circuit
reasoned that Grayson reflected a notion of rehabilitation that has
been abandoned under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, and
that the application of section 3CI.l to trial perjury also amounted
to the kind of "wooden and reflexive" punishment of trial perjury
that Grayson had disapproved. 398
389. 113 S. Ct. 1111 (1993).
390.

UNITED STATES SENTENCING CoIl~sIsSION,

FEDERAL SENTENCING

GUIDELINEs MANUAL § 3C1.1 (Nov. 1989). Section 3C1.1 states: "If the

defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede,
the administration of justice during the investigation, prosecution, or
sentencing of the instant offense, increase the offense level by [two) levels."
Id. The commentary lists examples of the types of conduct to which the
enhancement applies, such as "testifying untruthfully or suborning untruthful
testimony concerning a material fact,. . . during any judicial proceeding." Id.
391. Dunnigan, 113 S. Ct. at 1113.
392. Id. at 1114.
393. Id.
394. Id. at 1114-15.
395. United States v. Dunnigan, 944 F.2d 178 (4th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 113
S. Ct. 1111 (1993).
396. 438 U.S. 41 (1978).
397. Dunnigan, 944 F.2d at 184 (citing Grayson, 438 U.S. at 55).
398. Id.
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Justice Kennedy rejected both the Fourth Circuit's reasoning
and Dunnigan's claim that the sentence enhancement violated her
Sixth Amendment 399 right to testify in her own defense. 400 Cases
such as Grayson, Kennedy pointed out, established clearly that "a
defendant's right to testify does not include [the] right to commit
perjury."' 40 1 He also rejected the defense claim that section 3C1.1
exposes the defendant to the risk that enhancement will be
forthcoming even when a defendant's testimony is truthful either
because the court is acting automatically or makes an erroneous
finding of falsity:
[o]f course, not every accused who testifies at trial and is
convicted will incur an enhanced sentence under § 3C1.1 for
committing perjury.... [A]n accused may give inaccurate
testimony due to confusion, mistake or faulty memory. In other
instances, an accused may testify to matters such as lack of
capacity, insanity, duress or self-defense. Her testimony may be
truthful, but the jury may nonetheless find the testimony
insufficient to excuse criminal liability or prove lack of intent.
For these reasons, if a defendant objects to a sentence
enhancement resulting from her trial testimony, a district court
must review the evidence and make independent findings
necessary to establish a willful impediment to or obstruction of
justice, or an attempt to do the same, under the perjury definition
we have set out. 402
Justice Kennedy also rejected the argument that using section
3C1.1 to address perjury is merely a surrogate for a full-blown
prosecution. 40 3 He found that
[i]t furthers legitimate sentencing goals relating to the principal
crime,
including
the
goals
of
retribution
and
incapacitation ....It is rational for a sentencing authority to

conclude that a defendant who commits a crime and then perjures
herself in an unlawful attempt to avoid responsibility is more

399. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
400. Dunnigan, 113 S. Ct. at 1117.
401. Id. (citations omitted).
402. Id.
403. Id. at 1118.
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threatening to society and less deserving of leniency than a
defendant who does not so defy the trial process. 4 0 4

The Court's language in Grayson regarding rehabilitation, he
emphasized, did not mean that now discarded goal was the only
permissible justification for increasing a sentence because of
perjury. 40 5
As a matter of constitutional law, this battle was over with
Grayson. In a pragmatic sense, Dunnigan presents a more severe
tactical problem for defense counsel in federal prosecutions than
did Grayson. As Justice Kennedy noted, the sentence
enhancement in Grayson was merely permissive; the
enhancement provided under section 3C1.1 is mandatory if the
requisite findings are made. 40 6 Consider also the nature of
Dunnigan's testimony. She did little more than deny her guilt.
She did not fabricate a defense nor did she accuse the
government's witnesses of lying. While under Grayson there was
certainly a risk of enhancement for perjury, the risk was not
nearly as great as it is under section 3C.1. Consequently, as one
respected defense attorney has pointed out, "[i]t is now virtually
mandatory for defense lawyers to advise clients that if they
choose to testify, any sentence imposed on conviction will almost
certainly be enhanced." 40 7
In Stinson v. United States,40 8 the Court, in a unanimous
opinion authored by Justice Kennedy, held that the Sentencing
Guidelines Manual's commentary, which "interprets or explains a
guideline is authoritative unless it violates the Constitution or a
federal statute, or is inconsistent with, or a plainly erroneous
reading of, that guideline." 40 9

404. Id. (citations omitted).

405. Id.
406. Id. at 1119.
407. Ira Mickenberg, Crime Docket Was Quiet, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 23,

1993, at S6.
408. 113 S. Ct. 1913 (1993).

409. Id. at 1915; see also UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMl..ISION,
§ 4B1. 1 (Nov. 1992).

FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
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Stinson pleaded guilty to a five-count indictment resulting from
his robbery of a bank. 4 10 The district court sentenced him as a
career offender under the Guidelines Manual, section 4B1.1, 4 11

which inter alia, requires that "'the instant offense of conviction
be a crime of violence. ' " 4 12 The court found that Stinson's

offense of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon was a
crime of violence as that term was defined in Sentencing
Guideline 4B1.2(1). 4 13 While the case was on appeal, however,

the Sentencing Commission promulgated Amendment 433, which
added a sentence to the section 4B1.2 commentary that expressly
excluded the felon-in-possession offense from the "crime of

violence" definition. 4 14 Nevertheless, the Eleventh Circuit
affirmed Stinson's sentence, adhering to its earlier interpretation
that the crime in question was categorically a crime of violence
410. Stinson, 113 S. Ct. at 1915.
411. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, FEDERAL SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.1 (Nov. 1992). Section 4B1. 1 provides:
A defendant is a career offender if (1) the defendant was at least
eighteen years old at the time of the instant offense, (2) the instant
offense of conviction is a felony that is either a crime of violence or a
controlled substance offense, and (3) the defendant has at least two prior
felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled
substance offense.
Id.
412. Stinson, 113 S. Ct. at 1915 (quoting UNITED STATES SENTENCING
COMMISSION, FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, § 4B1.1 (Nov.
1992)).
413. Id.; see also UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, FEDERAL

SENTENCING GUIDEINEs MANUAL, § 4B1.2 (Nov. 1992). Section 4BI.2,
provides in part: "[t]he term 'crime of violence' means any offense under
federal or state law punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year
-- (i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical
force against the person of another. ... " Id. In the commentary, the "crimes
of violence" include: "murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, aggravated assault,
forcible sex offenses, robbery, arson, extortion, extortionate extension of
credit, and burglary of a dwelling." Id.
414. Stinson, 113 S. Ct. at 1916. The commentary to the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines Manual states: "[t]he term 'crime of violence' does not
include the offense of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon." UNITED
STATES

SENTENCING

COMMISSION,

FEDERAL

SENTENCING

GUIDELINES

MANUAL § 4B1.2 (Nov. 1992).
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and holding that the commentary to the Guidelines is not binding
15
on the federal courts. 4

In vacating and remanding the Eleventh Circuit's decision,
Justice Kennedy concluded that the commentary at issue in the
case is of a type that, in the Sentencing Commission's words,
"'interpret[s a] guideline or explain[s] how it is to be
applied.'" 4 16 This sort of commentary, he pointed out, is
controlling and enjoys the same status as policy statements. 4 17
Justice Kennedy also provided some guidance as to how the
commentary should be utilized. First, he instructed, it is not to be
treated like a legislative committee report because frequently,
commentary will not be issued contemporaneously with the
guideline it interprets but will have been added long after the
guideline was promulgated. 4 18 Second, it should not be treated
like the legislative rules an agency promulgates in interpreting the
statute it administers, because "[c]ommentary, unlike a legislative
rule, is not the product of delegated authority for rulemaking,
which of course must yield to the clear meaning of a statute." 4 19

"Rather, commentary explains the guidelines and provides
concrete guidance as to how even unambiguous guidelines are to
be applied in practice." 42 0
Justice Kennedy further explained that it is the guidelines
themselves that are the "equivalent of legislative rules," because
it was the guidelines that were promulgated pursuant to delegated
congressional authority and through informal rulemaking
procedures. 42 1 The functional purpose of the commentary,
therefore, is to assist in the interpretation and application of the
415. United States v. Stinson, 957 F.2d 813, 815 (1lth Cir. 1992), vacated,
113 S. Ct. 1913 (1993).

416. Stinson, 113 S. Ct. at 1917 (quoting UNITED STATES SENTENCING
COMMISSION,

FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL

§ IBI.7 (Nov.

1992)).
417. Id. at 1917-18.
418. Id. at 1918.
419. Id. (quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984)).
420. Id.

421. Id. at 1919.
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rule. 422 Consequently, as with the standard applied to an
agency's interpretation of its own legislative rules, the Guidelines
commentary is binding authority, so long as it does not violate
the Constitution or a federal statute and is not "'plainly erroneous
4 23
or inconsistent with the regulation'" it interprets.
In Parke v. Raley,42 4 the Court again dealt with a sentencing
enhancement issue. However, unlike Dunnigan, the issue
involved not the basis for enhancement but the procedures
employed. 425 In 1986, Raley was charged with robbery and with
being a persistent felony offender under a Kentucky statute that
enhances sentences for repeat felons. 426 Raley moved to suppress
his 1979 and 1981 felony guilty pleas that formed the basis for
the enhanced penalty. 427 His claim was that both were invalid
because the records of the two cases contained no transcripts of
the proceedings and hence did not affirmatively show, as
required by Boykin v. Alabama,428 that his pleas were knowing
and voluntary. 42 9 Kentucky law placed the ultimate burden of
persuasion on the state, but a presumption of regularity attached
to the judgments once the state proved their existence, and the
burden then shifted to Raley to produce evidence of their
invalidity .430

The Sixth Circuit held that the Kentucky procedure was a
violation of due process, as determined by its prior decision in
Dunn v. Simmons, 43 1 which held that when a defendant
challenges the knowingness and voluntariness of a guilty plea,
and a transcript of the colloquy mandated by Boykin is not
available, the state must bear the entire burden of proving the
422. Id.
423. Id. (quoting Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414
(1945)).
424. 113 S.Ct. 517 (1992).
425. Id. at 519.
426. Id. at 520.
427. Id.
428. 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
429. Parke, 113 S.Ct. at 520.
430. Id.
431. 877 F.2d 1275 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1061 (1990).
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validity of the plea and may not rely on the presumption of
regularity that normally attends final judgments. 432
Justice O'Connor, writing for the Court, held that the Sixth
Circuit had placed too much weight on the statement in Boykin
that waiver of rights resulting from a guilty plea cannot be
"'presume[d] ... from a silent record.'" 433 She pointed out that
Boykin involved direct review of a guilty plea conviction,
whereas this case amounts to a collateral attack. 434 "To import
Boykin's presumption of invalidity into this very different context
would, [she stated], improperly ignore another presumption
deeply rooted in our jurisprudence: the 'presumption of
regularity' that attaches to final judgments, even when the
question is waiver of constitutional rights." 435 She argued, given
that Boykin was decided 25 years ago, "it defies logic to presume
from the mere unavailability of a transcript... that the
defendant was not advised of his fights."436
There is nothing momentous in the Court's holding that the
Due Process Clause permits a State to impose a burden of
production on a defendant who challenges the validity of a prior
conviction under Boykin. As the Court points out, States vary in
their approach; some put the entire burden on the prosecution,
others do not.437 Our own New York Court of Appeals has
upheld placement of the "entire burden [on] the defendant once
the government has established the fact of conviction." 438 Had
the Supreme Court upheld the Sixth Circuit in Parke, it would, of
course, have been a matter of some moment in New York.

432. Raley v. Parke, 945 F.2d 137 (6th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 517
(1992).
433. Parke, 113 S. Ct. at 523 (quoting Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S 238,
243 (1969)).
434. Id.
435. Id.
436. Id. at 524.
437. Id. at 525.
438. People v. Harris, 61 N.Y.2d 9, 15, 459 N.E.2d 170, 172, 471
N.Y.S.2d 61, 63 (1983).
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CONCLUSION

In sum, the 1992 Term in regard to criminal law was relatively
uneventful. There were no bombshell cases and the civil
forfeiture cases arguably stand out in bold relief because of the
relative calm in other criminal matters. The other cases which I
have discussed, though numerous, find their significance mainly
in the working out of various doctrines, the major aspects of
which were long ago set in motion. If I had to choose my
personal favorite, I would select Withrow v. Williams.4 39 On the
other side of the ledger, if you allowed me "one on the house"
for recall, I would cancel Brecht v. Abrahamson.44 0 Perhaps the
1993 Term, with the advent of Justice Ginsberg, will be more
exciting.
Hon. George C. Pratt:
Professor Hellerstein, thank you very much. Just one
observation, I share your concern about the institutional
implications on double jeopardy of overruling a recent precedent
of that sort; but a personal view, if they had to pick a case to
overrule, they could not have picked a better one than Grady v.
Corbin.44 1 Grady was Justice Brennan's last opinion and I always
had the view, almost as if he had taken leave of his senses. An
impossible case to apply in any context.
Professor Gary M. Shaw:
I find it is always difficult to try and find a question after
Professor Hellerstein has lectured, only because I find that I
usually agree with him one hundred percent. This is another one
of those instances.
439. 113 S. Ct. 1745 (1993). See supra notes 169-211 and accompanying
text.
440. 113 S. Ct. 1710 (1993). See supra notes 212-252 and accompanying
text.

441. 495 U.S. 508 (1990), overruled by United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct.
2849 (1993). See supra notes 292-331 and accompanying text.
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When I teach criminal procedure, I have to tell my students
that this is a history course in the protections that the Fourth,
Fifth and Sixth Amendments used to give. It seems to me there is
a continuing pattern, so I really do not have a question as much
as a comment. That it seems to me that this Term was simply
another Term in the continuing odyssey of the Supreme Court to
continue to dilute the rights protected by the Fourth, Fifth and
Sixth Amendments.
In fairness to the other side, I should note that one of my
students, in a student newspaper last year said that this was
indeed symptomatic of a healthy detached reality or detachment
from reality. There is another perspective, I suppose. You see the
aspect of that other perspective in recent election results in which
the fear of crime played a major part in election results. I suspect
that those concerns about crime are driving the Supreme Court
and many of the lower courts as well.
It is almost disturbing in one respect, for someone who takes
the position that I think Professor Hellerstein and I take, to find
the Supreme Court actually being outflanked by lower federal
courts. It says something, I suppose, that lower federal courts are
going so much further than the Supreme Court that even the
Supreme Court had to reverse in cases like United States v.
Padilla.442 For defense counsel out there, that means that, as has
been the case in recent years, the first line of defense must be the
state courts. There is an increasing divergence in some respects
between New York State constitutional law and federal
constitutional law. You see it in the fact that, for example, New
York also continues to follow Aguilar-Spinelli443 regarding the
issuance of warrants as opposed to Illinois v. Gates.44 4 So it
442. 113 S. Ct. 1936 (1993) (per curiam), rev'g 960 F.2d 854 (9th Cir.
1992).
443. See Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964); Spinelli v. United States,

393 U.S. 410 (1969) (enunciating from Aguilar and Spinelli a two prong test,
which requires reliability of the source of information and of the informant's
knowledge, to determine probable cause for a search warrant to issue).
444. 462 U.S. 213 (1983) (setting forth a "totality of the circumstances"
test, rather than the Aguilar-Spinelli two prong test, for finding probable cause
to issue a search warrant).
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seems to me what happened this last Term is simply another
example of the Court continuing to dilute rights and for defense
counsel out there, the need to rely more on state constitutional
law rather than federal constitutional law.
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